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INTRODUCTION
More than ten years after the end of the Cold War era, many
countries continue to make the transition from state-dominated to
market-based economies.' Since the mid-1980s, developed countries
1. See JACQUES ROGOZINSKI, HIGH PRICE FOR CHANGE: PRIVATIZATION IN
MEXICO 75 (1998) (explaining the significant breadth of the privatization efforts in
Mexico from 1982-94); John White, Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe,
13 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 19, 19-20 (2000) (noting a shift from state-led growth
strategies in the 1960s and 1970s to privatization in the 1980s and 1990s due to
economic inefficiencies attributed to involvement of state actors in industry); id. at
21-24 (discussing privatization efforts in Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary).
See generally Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000) (detailing the
Russian experience with privatization and concluding that Russia lacked
institutions to control self-dealing); John R. Dempsey, Note, Thailand's
Privatization of State Owned Enterprises During the Economic Downturn, 31 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 373, 374 (2000) (recognizing economic benefits of
privatization, but noting political difficulties in implementation).
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have also increasingly attempted to privatize major state-owned
industries.2 Privatization often means that entities the state previously
subsidized will no longer receive such subsidies.3 Thus, privatization
raises the question of how to apply the definition of a subsidy' in a
countervailing duty investigation when a privatized entity, which no
longer receives a subsidy, did receive a subsidy before it was
privatized. Specifically, the question raised is whether a non-
recurring financial contribution to the previous owners still confers a
benefit to the new owners, and therefore qualifies as a
countervailable subsidy. Countervailing duty law, which is meant to
offset subsidies with duties on subsidized products,' is a mechanism
2. See generally HARVEY FEIGENBAUM ET AL., SHRINKING TIlE STATE 36, 59,
87 (1999) (exploring the privatization experiences of Great Britain, France, and the
United States); PRIVATISATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TIIEORY AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES 88, 101, 218 (David Parker ed., 1998) (outlining privatization
efforts in countries of the European Union including Great Britain, Germany, and
France); George Melloan, Global View: A GOP Challenge: How to De-Invent
Government, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Al I (noting a trend toward
privatizing state-owned sectors in Europe and encouraging United States policy-
makers to lessen the role of the state). Great Britain, Germany, and France rank
among the top ten United States trading partners, which insures that this issue of
how to treat prior non-recurring subsidies in privatized entities will be the subject
of future disputes. See Census Bureau "Top Ten Countries With Which the United
States Trades" at http:/lwww.census.gov/foreign-
trade/top/dst/2000/10/balance.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001); Overview of the
State-of-Play of WTO Disputes at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-.e/dispu-e/dispue.htm (WT/DS212/1) para.
VII(72) (last modified July 13, 2001) [hereinafter Status of Dispute Settlement]
(stating that European Commission requested on September 10 a panel be formed
regarding application of countervailing duties by the United States against several
European companies in violation of its obligations under the \WTO Subsidies
Agreement). Brazil requested consultations Dec. 21, 2000 on the same issue. See
id. para. VII(78).
3. See JACQUES V. DINAVO, PRIVATIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ITS
IMPACT ON EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY 14 (1995) (explaining that
by eliminating "costly subsidies" that governments pay to state-owned entities,
privatization played a significant role in reducing government deficits); id. at 4
(describing privatization as a "reduction of the role that the state plays in supplying
goods and services to the population").
4. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1994) (defining a subsidy generally as a financial
contribution by a government actor that confers a benefit).
5. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105Tt! CONG.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF UNITED STATES TRADE STATLTES 59 (Comm.
Print 1997) (explaining that countervailing duties imposed are equal to -net
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through which many countries, including the United States, may
impose a countervailing duty on certain products if a country
determines that the product is subsidized and there is a "material
injury" to that country's competing domestic industry.6
The United States' current application of countervailing duty law,
wherein the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") must answer
the threshold question of whether a subsidy exists,' is inconsistent
with its role as a leader in promoting market-based economies with
minimal state intervention! Current Commerce methodology,
referred to as change-of-ownership methodology, assumes that
private investors who buy state-owned companies automatically
derive a benefit from past subsidies despite having paid fair market
value for the privatized entity.' This methodology places an
amount" of subsidies conferred on imported products).
6. See id. (providing general outline on purpose and application of United
States countervailing duty law). The 1999 data regarding use of countervailing
duty law reflects continuation of trends apparent during the early 1980s (pre-WTO
Subsidies Agreement). Compare World Trade Organization Annual Report 2000,
at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/anrep-e/anreO0-e.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2001), at 46 [hereinafter WTO Annual Report] (noting that of the thirty-
six new countervailing duty cases initiated - and 108 countervailing duty orders in
force - in 1999 the United States initiated ten and the European Commission
("EC") initiated twenty), with I THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY 1986-1992 809, 818 n.47 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1992) [hereinafter
NEGOTIATING HISTORY] (indicating that the United States and Chile initiated more
than 90 percent of the countervailing duty cases between 1980 and 1986). The
United States has sixty-one, Mexico has eleven, and the EC has six countervailing
duty orders in force. See WTO Annual Report, at 46. Countries subject to the
newest countervailing duty investigations in 1999 include: India (subject to six),
Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand (each subject to five), and Korea (subject to
three). Id.
7. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (defining subsidy); see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF UNITED
STATES TRADE STATUTES 59-60 (Comm. Print 1997) (describing the
countervailing duty investigation process).
8. See David Codevilla, Comment, Discouraging the Practice of What We
Preach: Saarstahl I, Inland Steel and the Implementation of the Uruguay' Round of
GATT 1994, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 435, 470-71 (1995) (arguing that
certain amendments codifying the results of the Uruguay Round into United States
law are a "significant disincentive for privatization").
9. See WTO Rejects U.S. CVD Rules on Privatization in British Steel Case, 18
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 19 (May 12, 2000) available at http://www.insidetrade.coin
(reporting on May 10, 2000 WTO Appellate Body ruling that affirmed initial Panel
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unnecessary cost on the already difficult task of privatization when
the United States insists upon carrying forward liability for prior
non-recurring subsidies to the newly privatized entity."0 Further, this
methodology is inconsistent with the United States' obligations
under the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures ("WTO Subsidies Agreement").II
This Comment focuses on how the United States applies its
definition of subsidy in countervailing duty investigations, which
involve newly privatized entities, and explains why this application
is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the WTO
Subsidies Agreement. Exploration of these questions is accomplished
in the context of recent developments regarding this issue, including:
(1) the WTO Dispute Panel Decision in the British Steel Case; - (2)
the Federal Circuit's decision in Delverde, SrL v. United States; " (3)
Commerce's Final Redetermination 4 in response to Delverde; and
Decision in the British Steel case and rejected United States' methodology in
subsidies cases) (on file with author).
10. See ROGozINSKI, supra note 1, at 135-36 (recognizing among the short-
term costs of privatization rising unemployment, reduced profits, and reduced
productivity); White, supra note 1, at 21 (noting the World Bank's practical
assessment that privatization is "intensely a political process" and subsequently
some people will suffer costs).
11. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, available at
http://wxvw.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/final_e.htm (Jan. 11, 2001), or 1994
WL 761483 [hereinafter WTO Subsidies Agreement].
12. See United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom, Report of the Panel, WT/DS138/R (Dec. 23, 1999), afl'd, Report of
Appellate Body, WT/DS 138/AB/R (May 10, 2000), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/distab-e.htm [hereinafter British
Steel Panel Decision] (holding United States in violation of its obligations under
the WTO Subsidies Agreement).
13. Delverde, SrL v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh'g en
banc denied (June 20, 2000). In 1991, Delverde paid fair market value for a pasta
factory that had, under its prior ownership, received subsidies from the Italian
government from 1983 until 1991. Id. at 1362. The court held that Commerce's
"per se" rule, which assumed the new owner received a benefit and thus a subsidy
continued to exist, was in "direct conflict" with statutory language. Id. at 1367.
14. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, (Dec. 4,
2000) Delverde, SrL v. United States, Consol. Court No. 96-08-01997, Remand
2001]
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(4) Final Redeterminations for several steel countervailing duty
cases1 5 pending before the Court of International Trade ("CIT") when
Delverde was decided.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the development
of United States countervailing duty law, with particular emphasis on
Commerce's applications of the law in the privatization context over
time.' 6 Part I also discusses the CIT and Federal Circuit's treatment
of Commerce's methodology before and after changes were made in
United States law to reflect WTO Subsidies Agreement obligations. 7
Part I next maintains that Commerce's current use of the change-of-
ownership methodology in its application of countervailing duty law
will face serious challenges as a result of a recent Federal Circuit
opinion and a WTO panel decision. 8
Part II provides a brief overview of efforts to formulate a
multilateral agreement on subsidies and describes the culmination of
this effort in the WTO Subsidies Agreement. 9 It also discusses the
evolution of the general definition of a subsidy in the WTO
Order (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Delverde
Redetermination] (describing Commerce methodology post-Delverde).
15. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, ILVA
Lamiere e Tubi S.p.A. v. United States, Court No. 00-03-00127, Remand Order
(Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 2000) [Italy 64 Fed. Reg. 73,244] [hereinafter ILVA
Redetermination]; Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, Consol. Court No.
99-09-00566, Remand Order (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 2000) [France 64 Fed. Reg.
30,774] [hereinafter Usinor Redetermination]; Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v.
United States, Court No. 99-06-00364, Remand Order (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 2000)
[Italy 64 Fed. Reg. 15,508] [hereinafter AST Redetermination]]. These cases are a
representative sampling of steel-related cases addressing privatization issues that
were pending before the Court of International Trade ("CIT"), remanded to
Commerce, and filed with the CIT by Commerce in December 2000 [hereinafter
Steel-Related Redeterminations] (on file at CIT and with the author).
16. See infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text (describing development of
United States countervailing duty law and Commerce's application of the same in
privatization context).
17. See infr-a notes 46-70 and accompanying text (explaining application of the
law in context of the Saarstahl and Delverde cases).
18. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (accounting current litigation
before the CIT and WTO, which indicates that the dispute over this issue will
continue).
19. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (describing development of'
the 1979 Subsidies Code and WTO Subsidies Agreement).
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Subsidies Agreement. 20 Further, this section explains how the United
States attempted to harmonize United States law to reflect its
international obligations with respect to this subsidy definition.'
Next, Part III asserts that the WTO Subsidies Agreement is a
viable mechanism for reducing trade-distorting subsidies, but the
benefit component of the subsidy definition remains ambiguous in
application. 22 Part III continues by analyzing relevant provisions of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, with particular emphasis on the
definition of a subsidy.23 The analysis focuses on the difficulty in
defining or attributing the "benefit" component of the subsidy
definition and explains why this difficulty is relevant to the
privatization of state-owned entities.24
Following this analysis, Part IV examines whether United States
countervailing duty law is consistent with the United States'
obligations under the WTO Subsidies Agreement through a
discussion of the British Steel Panel Decision." It further explores
the implications of the Federal Circuit's Delverde decision, which
addresses the question of whether a benefit can be presumed under
United States law when there has been a change-of-ownership and
the prior owner received a non-recurring subsidy. 26 Part IV concludes
that Commerce's change-of-ownership methodology is inconsistent
with the plain language of the United States statute, thereby violating
the United States' obligations under the WTO Subsidies
20. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (stating the difficulty
encountered in formulating an acceptable subsidy definition).
21. See infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text (comparing WNITO
Subsidies Agreement with subsequent changes made to United States law).
22. See ifra notes 128-138 and accompanying text (assessing \\'TO Subsidies
Agreement, in particular the definition of subsidy).
23. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text (focusing on potential
weakness in WTO definition of subsidy).
24. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text (suggesting benefit is
defined by inference under Article 14 of the WTrlO Subsidies Agreement).
25. See infra notes 147-192 and accompanying text (discussing how WTO
panel found United States in violation of its obligations under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement).
26. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (clarifying that Delverde
found its interpretation of United States Law as not inconsistent with the WTO
British Steel decision).
2001]
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Agreement. 27
Based on the prior analysis, Part V recommends several ways to
address the inconsistency between application of United States
countervailing duty law and the United States' obligations under the
WTO Subsidies Agreement.28 First, Commerce should refrain from
presuming a benefit has been conferred to a newly privatized entity
and engage in a case-by-case analysis of whether the privatization
occurred in a way that was consistent with commercial terms. This
recommendation could be accomplished through a rulemaking
exercise. Second, in light of recent developments, parties to current
litigation should continue to pursue their challenges in United States
courts. Third, Congress should make clear that it does not intend to
discourage privatization and clarify its intent in United States law.
This Comment concludes that the United States should change its
current application of countervailing duty law to reflect the original
purpose of the law, which is to merely offset subsidies that foreign
governments give to products imported by the United States. When
newly privatized entities no longer receive the benefit of government
subsidies, they should not be penalized with countervailing duties for
subsidies received before they were privatized. Further, such changes
by Commerce would ensure that United States countervailing duty
law is consistent with its obligations under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: UNITED STATES
LAW
A. BACKGROUND ON UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAW
Congress passed the first United States countervailing duty law in
189729 and did not make any major changes to this law until 1979. o
27. See infra notes 203-208 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Delverde and WTO British Steel decisions undermine the validity of Commerce's
methodology).
28. See infra notes 209-225 and accompanying text (outlining
recommendations).
29. See Tariff Act of 1897, ch. I1, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897) (repealed
[17:79
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In 1979, the United States changed its law to comply with the 1979
Tokyo Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
Subsidies Code. 3' The next significant change in United States
countervailing duty law came in 1994 with the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA").32
Generally, under current United States law, a subsidy exists when
a government actor makes a financial contribution to a person
(natural or legal) and thereby confers a benefit. 3 Further, the overall
1994). The provisions read:
whenever any country, dependency, or colony shall pay or bestow, directly or
indirectly, any bounty or grant upon exportation of any article or merchandise
from such country... then upon the importation of any such article or
merchandise into the United States ... there shall be levied and paid ... an
additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant ....
Id. The 1897 Act expanded authorization for countervailing duties to all imports
from an earlier countervailing duty law, which only applied to sugar. See 30 CONG.
REC. 2202-04 (1897) (remarks of Sen. Gray) (arguing against legislation on
account of a possible violation of treaty obligations and because no justification
exists for "compensating" sugar manufacturers and "'depriving" American people
of cheap sugar). Cf 30 CONG. REC. 2205 (remarks of Sen. Caffrey) (arguing that
imposition of countervailing duties is necessary as a "'self-defense" measure for
domestic companies).
30. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MIEANS, 105TII CONG.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF UNITED STATES TRADE STATUTi-S 59, 60
(Comm. Print 1997) (outlining development of, and changes in, United States
countervailing duty law).
31. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101. 93 Stat. 144,
150-93 (1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1994)).
32. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103465, tit. 11, 108 Stat.
4809, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1994) [hereinafter URAA] (codifying WTO
Agreement into United States law). Relevant sections to this discussion, which
address the definition of a subsidy, can be found at section 771(5)(B), (E), and (F)
of the 1994 Act and at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). (E), and (F). The change-of-
ownership provision at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(F) is especially relevant to the
privatization issue. See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text (describing the
change the URAA made to United States countervailing duty law).
33. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(B). This section, which defines a subsidy under
current United States law, states:
A subsidy is described in this paragraph in the case in which an authority - (i)
provides a financial contribution, (ii) provides any form of income or price
support within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994, or (iii) makes
a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial contribution, or
entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribution, if
providing the contribution vould normally be vested in the government and
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
purpose of countervailing duty law is to offset the "competitive
advantage" a foreign producer may have over a domestic producer as
a result of subsidies received.34 There has been much debate,
however, as to the purpose, administration, and overall effectiveness
of United States countervailing duty law.35
B. AGENCY APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAW IN THE PRIVATIZATION CONTEXT
In 1989, Commerce, for the first time, faced the issue of how to
treat prior non-recurring subsidies in a privatized entity in an
Administrative Review of a Countervailing Duty Order on Lime
from Mexico.36 In this proceeding, Commerce found that the newly
the practice does not differ in substance from practices normally followed by
governments, to a person and a benefit is there conferred.
Id.
34. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1978)
(arguing that according to the earliest legislative history of the law and language of
the statute, a countervailing duty intends to offset the "unfair competitive
advantage" that a foreign producer derives from a subsidy at the expense of a
United States domestic producer).
35. See generally E. Kwaku Andoh, Counter-vailing Duties in a Not Quite
Peifect World: An Economic Analysis, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1515, 1525-27 (1992)
(concluding that application of United States countervailing duty law is
inconsistent with its original purpose, which is to offset a competitive advantage of
foreign producers who receive a subsidy); id. at 1516 (noting "protectionist
underpinnings" of United States countervailing duty law); Richard Diamond, A
Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration f/" United
States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507, 605-07 (1990)
(complaining that lack of a consistent, underlying economic model to guide
implementation of United States countervailing duty law risks an arbitrary United
States model that other countries could mimic); Joan L. MacKenzie,
Countervailing Duty Relations-Issues Highlight, 1075 PLI/CORP 669, 672-75
(1998) (commenting on development of countervailing duty regulations in light of
the URAA); Robert E. Nielsen, The Commerce Department Speaks on
International Trade and Investment, 864 PLI/CORP 7, 23-24 (1994) (explaining
Commerce's privatization methodology and why subsidies "pass through"): David
Rushford, Subsidies and Privatization: Protectionism " Integral Role in United
States Trade Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 485, 511 (1999) (concluding that United
States countervailing duty law penalizes privatization and undermines free trade).
36. See Lime from Mexico; Preliminary Results of Changed Circumstances
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 1753, 1754-55 (Jan. 17,
1989) [hereinafter Lime from Mexico] (finding that prior subsidies do not confer a
benefit to new private owner). In the Final Results, the original Order was revoked
[17:79
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privatized entity under review was fully privatized in an arm's length
transaction for which market value was paid; thus, no benefits passed
through from the formerly state-owned entity to the private investor
because the price paid reflected market value. 3 Commerce took an
entirely different approach, however, when it reviewed the
privatization issue in 1993 in the context of several steel
countervailing duty investigations.38  Commerce essentially
effective on the date of Mexico's accession to GATT due to applicable law. See
Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Administrative
Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,324 (Nov.
30, 1989); see also Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,037, 15,042 (Apr. 22, 1986)
(finding that, where private investor bought assets of company in receivership in
an arm's length transaction at market value, benefits of subsidies "'if there are any,
are not passed through.").
37. See Lime from Mexico, supra note 36, at 1754-55 (explaining that fair
market value paid extinguishes the benefits of prior non-recurring subsidies for a
formerly state-owned company). If a new owner pays fair market value, it is
reasonable to presume that the company no longer enjoys any benefit of previous
subsidies because such benefits "are fully reflected in the purchase price and are
not passed through to the purchaser." Id.
38. See Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products from the
United Kingdom, 58 Fed. Reg. 6237, 6240 (Jan. 27. 1993) (final affirmative
determination) [hereinafter U.K. Final Determination] (noting that the formation of
a joint venture, where 50 percent of assets were formerly state-owned and received
subsidies, occurred after years of contentious arm's-length negotiations). The
WTO also reviewed this investigation for its consistency with the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, but the period of investigation was 1995-97 because the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act was not approved until December 1994 and was not
applicable until January 1, 1995 upon effectiveness of the W% TO Subsidies
Agreement. See British Steel Panel Decision. supra note 12, para. 2.6 (explaining
factual background of dispute); see also infra notes 148-208 and accompanying
text (analyzing British Steel as a case study). It is also interesting to note that this
investigation, along with many other steel complaints at the time, was initiated
shortly after expiration of several voluntary restraint agreements from the 1980s
restricting steel imports, and on the heels of significant political pressure by the
United States domestic steel industry to "do something" about imports. See John
N. Maclean, Big Steel Fears for Import Lids. CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1992, available at
1992 WL 11110178 (noting competitive environment of global steel industry and
decline of government support (i.e., subsidies) to foreign steel producers); Steel
Companies Seek Relief from Imports, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 1, 1992, available
at 1992 WL 3841114 (suggesting that United States steel producers' inability to
compete stems from cheap foreign steel that producers in countries such as Brazil,
Britain, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Romania "'dumped" in United States
market); USX Chairman Backs Steel Import Duties, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 30,
1993, available at 1993 WL 5298106 (quoting USX Chairman as saying Clinton
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disregarded whether the change-of-ownership occurred at fair market
value by maintaining that the sale of a business or business unit does
not extinguish a previously conferred non-recurring subsidy."
Rather, subsidies would merely travel to their "new home" in the
privatized entity with the assumption that the new owner derives a
benefit through, for example, receipt of an equity infusion on terms
inconsistent with market value.40
Six months later, Commerce again changed how it applied
countervailing duty law in the privatization context when it issued
the General Issues Appendix ("GIA") in the context of several
countervailing duty investigations.4' In the GIA, Commerce
formulated a methodology that assumes a subsidy passes through to
the newly privatized entity from the previous state-owned entity,
except for the portion of the subsidy that the purchase price is
considered to have extinguished or repaid.42 Commerce calculates
this extinguished or repaid portion through a complicated formula it
created and allocates the subsidy amount that did pass through
according to amortization schedules of the asset that received the
"can create jobs by fighting unfair trade").
39. See U.K. Final Determination, supra note 38, at 6240 (explaining that
Commerce does not "tie the benefit level of subsidies to changes in the company
under investigation.").
40. See id. (allocating pass through of subsidies to "productive units" because
the administrative burden of allocating according to specific assets is too great).
Commerce also noted that it was motivated by a desire to guard against
circumvention of countervailing duty laws. Id.
41. See General Issues Appendix, appended to Certain Steel Products from
Austria, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,217, 37,259-65 (July 9, 1993) [hereinafter GIA]
(outlining a new "privatization methodology").
42. See id. at 37,262-63 (noting there was "no guidance" in statute, legislative
history, or case law regarding how to calculate repayments or amount of subsidy
"extinguished" by purchase price); see also Final Rule Countervailing Duties, 63
Fed. Reg. at 65,348, 65,353 (Nov. 25, 1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 35 1)
(noting argument by petitioner that repayment methodology is "inconsistent" with
benefit-to-recipient standard, and instead reflects cost-to-government standard).
The benefit-to-recipient standard, which finds a subsidy to exist when one receives
a financial contribution on terms that confer a market advantage, has long been the
United States' position in negotiations regarding international subsidies
agreements. See infra notes 92, 111, 116 and accompanying text (asserting United
States' long-time support of benefit-to-recipient standard versus European
Commission standard of cost-to-government to determine existence of subsidy).
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subsidy.43 Using the GIA methodology, Commerce has never found
that an arm's length market-based privatization transaction
extinguishes all prior non-recurring subsidies." Furthermore, the
GIA methodology makes it impossible to avoid subsidies being
passed-through to a new private owner who has paid fair market
value for the state-owned entity. 5 The courts have challenged
Commerce's GIA methodology in several instances.
C. THE CIT CHALLENGES AGENCY APPLICATION: SAARSTAHL
In 1994, less than a year after Commerce first promulgated the
GIA methodology, the CIT rejected this methodology in the
Saarstah4 6 ("Saarstahl I") and Inland Stee4 7 cases. In these cases,
43. See GIA, supra note 41, at 37,262-63 (arguing that the statute did not
permit reevaluation of a subsidy "based on subsequent events in the marketplace").
Interestingly, Commerce acknowledged privatization as a valid policy goal in the
GIA. Id. at 37,263. This acknowledgement was tempered, however, by its
argument that this policy "cannot impinge upon the statutory requirements of the
CVD law, which is designed to provide remedial relief to domestic industries." Id.
But cf James Bovard, The Moralit'" of Protectionisn. 25 N.Y.U. J. IT'L L. & POL.
235, 247-49 (1993) (suggesting trade barriers are a political decision whereby
greater importance is placed on the interests of domestic producers than the
interests of consumers). Bovard concludes by saying, '[i]t should not be a federal
crime to charge low prices to American consumers." Id. at 249.
44. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, at Attachment 1. 1, paras.
1-2 n.2 (arguing Commerce has not reviewed whether a benefit is conferred to a
privatized entity in its application of countervailing duty law, as is required).
45. See id. para. 14 n.17 (explaining "average prior subsidies would have to
exceed the average net worth of the company" in order to find subsidies
extinguished under Commerce's calculations), see also i. para. 68 n.62
(explaining how Commerce methodology is "flawed," which results in "arbitrary
and irrational" results).
46. See Saarstahl, AG v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 187, 195 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994), vacated by 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding Commerce's
privatization methodology, which resulted in "pass through" of subsidies to newly
privatized entity, was unlawful).
47. See Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 179, 186 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1994), vacated by 155 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding privatized
business that has paid fair market value has not received a benefit; thus, no "unfair
competitive advantage, which must be offset by CVDs" exists). Inland was
released the same day as Saarstahl I (June 7, 1994) and largely references
Saarstahl L See Inland, 858 F. Supp. at 185-86. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT's Inland decision on the same grounds as Saarstahl. See Inland
Steel Bar Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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the CIT stated that the purpose of countervailing duty laws is not "to
capture" a subsidy once bestowed; rather, the purpose is to offset
subsidies on goods entering the United States market with duties so
that American producers of competing goods are not at a
disadvantage.48 Thus, the CIT applied the pre-URAA countervailing
duty law4 9 and reasoned that there was no countervailable subsidy
because the buyer in a market-based, arm's-length transaction has
paid for all he is to receive; therefore, the buyer receives no
competitive benefit, within the meaning of the law, from prior
subsidies - the subsidies are extinguished."'
In 1996, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT's 1994 decision by
finding that the lower court failed to give appropriate deference to
Commerce's interpretation of the law in the absence of an "explicit
mandate" from Congress.51 In a footnote to the decision, the court's
majority noted that the CIT's decision was "fundamentally at odds"
with the new statutory scheme per the URAA, which included a
provision regarding change-of-ownership. 2 The Federal Circuit,
48. See Saarstahl, 858 F. Supp. at 194 (citing cases from the early 1900s where
courts explained the purpose of countervailing duty law, and noting Congress' lack
of guidance in assessing privatization issues).
49. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1988) (amended 1994) (defining subsidy as
including a domestic subsidy "if provided or required by government action to a
specific enterprise or industries, whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on
the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise."); see
also inf-a notes 107-119 and accompanying text (regarding United States approval
of URAA in December 1994).
50. See Saarstahl, 858 F. Supp. at 193 (explaining that in an arm's-length
transaction where fair market value is paid, the benefit does not survive and thus
cannot be conferred to a new owner).
51. See Saarstahl, 78 F.3d at 1544 (finding Commerce's methodology accounts
for a "number of possible scenarios" when determining the effect of privatization
on potential countervailable subsidies). But see iM. at 1545-49 (Plager, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that Commerce's methodology fails to fulfill the purpose
of United States countervailing duty law, which is "to offset the competitive
benefits foreign exporters enjoy through subsidized production or exportation.").
52. See id. at 1543 n.l. The statute provides:
A change-of-ownership of all or part of a foreign enterprise or the productive
assets of a foreign enterprise does not by itself require a determination by the
administering authority that a past countervailable subsidy received by the
enterprise no longer continues to be countervailable, even if the change in
ownership is accomplished through an arm's length transaction.
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however, based its decision on the prior statutory scheme." Thus, the
Federal Circuit did not seem receptive to construing the law
differently in light of URAA changes to the law. This reluctance
changed in the Delverde case, where the court found that the
Uruguay changes should have prompted Commerce to avoid a per se
rule, which assumes there is a benefit, and thus a countervailable
subsidy remains with the newly privatized entity.'
D. THE COURTS REVIEW AGENCY APPLICATION POST URUGUAY:
DEL VERDE
The Federal Circuit revisited the prior non-recurring subsidies
issue in Delverde." Delverde specifically addressed the URAA
change-of-ownership provision 6 and held that the provision directs
Commerce to avoid a per se rule of assuming subsidies pass through
to the new owner when the former owner received countervailable
subsidies. 7 The Delverde court cited report language from the
URAA indicating that Commerce has this discretion, but cautioned
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (1994).
53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1988) (defining subsidy pre-URAA);
Saarstahl, 78 F.3d at 1543 n.1 (arguing that URAA "profoundly changed" the law
by addressing specifically the change-of-ownership issue in privatization, whereas
this decision applying pre-URAA is a matter of deference to agency).
54. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1366 (finding that URAA legislative history
supported the court's conclusion that there should not be a per se rule).
55. See id. at 1369-70 (remanding case to CIT and ultimately to Commerce for
a determination on Delverde facts consistent with this holding). Delverde, which
involved a purely private transaction, differs slightly from earlier cases like
Saarstahl because the change-of-ownership was between purely private parties, but
the Delverde court did address the wider issue of determining the existence of
subsidies where there is any kind of change-of-ownership. See Saarstahl, 858 F.
Supp. at 189 (stating the state-owned steel producer received subsidies from 1978
until 1985 and was privatized in 1989); Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1362 (describing
transaction at issue).
56. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (1994) (noting a change-of-ownership does not
by itself require a determination that a previously countervailable subsidy is no
longer countervailable).
57. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1366 (explaining that the change-of-ownership
provision does not change the meaning of subsidy, but provision does say that
although an arm's-length transaction is required to extinguish subsidy, it may not
be sufficient); see also Saarstahl, 78 F.3d 1539 at 1548 (Plager, J., dissenting)
(discussing interpretation of the statute very similar to Delverde majority).
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Commerce to conduct a fact-intensive inquiry in order to determine
the terms of each transaction at issue and asserted that a presumption
that subsidies pass through cannot exist. 8 Consequently, the Federal
Circuit vacated the CIT's decision in Delverde5' and directed
Commerce to address the question of whether subsidies passed-
through in the Delverde transaction.60
In response to the Federal Circuit's decision, the CIT issued a
remand order in September 2000 directing Commerce to reevaluate
its methodology to make it consistent with the Delverde decision."
Commerce filed the Final Redetermination with the CIT on
58. See Dehverde, 202 F.3d at 1366-67 (suggesting that legislative history
supports the court's interpretation of the statute that requires finding a financial
contribution and benefit from government, and rejecting the assumption implicit in
Commerce's methodology that subsidies automatically pass through to new
owner); H.R. REP. NO. 103-826(I), at 110 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3773, 3882 (noting that the issue of privatization is "extremely complex and
multifaceted", and stating congressional intent that Commerce retain discretion in
privatization situations and give careful consideration to the facts of each case); S.
REP. No. 103-412, at 92 (explaining that an arm's-length transaction is not
sufficient to extinguish prior subsidies; Commerce should make a determination
"based on the facts" of each situation as to whether or not a privatization "actually
serve[s] to eliminate" subsidies). The language in the [louse and Senate Reports
does not announce that subsidies will continue to be countervailable despite a fair
market value transaction, which is Commerce's current practice; the language
merely cautions Commerce to examine the facts of arm's-length transactions. See
H.R. REP. No. 103-826(l), at 110; see also S. REP. No. 103-412, at 92.
59. See Delverde, 989 F. Supp. 218, 228, 230 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (finding
Commerce's privatization methodology inconsistent with § 1677(5)(F) and further
distinguishing Delverde from Saarstahl because Delverde involved purely private
transaction and URAA era law applies), remanded, 24 F. Supp. 2d 314 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1998) (finding Commerce's clarification of its application of change-of-
ownership and benefit provisions, which results in subsidies passing through to
new entity, "not the most natural reading of the statute ... [,but nonetheless]
permissible."), vacated and remanded, 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh ' en
banc denied (June 2000).
60. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369-70 (directing Commerce to examine the
"facts and circumstances, including the terms of the transaction" to determine
whether a subsidy exists).
61. See Delverde v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (remanding
case to Commerce); Delverde Redetermination, supra note 14, at 2 (noting court's
order to consider "facts and circumstances" and "terms of transaction" in its
assessment of whether a benefit was received).
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December 4, 2000.62 In the Delverde Redetermination, Commerce
essentially returned to the pre-GIA methodology, which assumes that
all prior non-recurring subsidies pass through to a new owner. '
Commerce declared that the test for whether subsidies pass through
to the new owner is whether the post-sale entity is a distinct entity
from the pre-sale entity.65 Essentially, Commerce's most recent
methodology asks, "whether the post-sale entity is the same
'person"' 66 in order to assess whether the privatized entity has
received a benefit, and therefore, a potentially countervailable
subsidy.
Subsequently, Commerce found the post-sale Delverde entity was
not distinct from the pre-sale Delverde entity.6' Commerce argued
62. Delverde Redetermination, supra note 14, at 2. Several steel cases, which
also raised the subsidies pass through issue and were pending before the CIT in
Spring 2000, were also remanded for a Redetermination consistent with Delverde.
See Steel-Related Redeterminations, supra note 15. Final Redeterminations of
these cases were also filed with the CIT in December 2000 and are now pending
before the CIT. Id.
63. See generally Delverde Redetermination, supra note 14. The
Redeterminations for the steel cases, where the company at issue was privatized,
all espouse the same methodology. See generally Steel-Related Redeterminations,
supra note 15.
64. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce's
application of countervailing duty law in privatization context).
65. See Delverde Redetermination. supra note 14. at 14 (explaining that inquiry
into whether subsidies pass through to new owners will focus on "whether the
post-sale entity is the same 'person' as the subsidized pre-sale entity"). Commerce
based its assessment of whether there were distinct pre- and post-sale entities on
the following factors: (1) continuity of general business operations; (2) continuity
of production facilities; (3) continuity of assets and liabilities; and (4) retention of
personnel. Id.; see also Steel-Related Redeterminations, supra note 15 (imposing
same test as in Delverde Redetermination on privatized steel companies to
determine whether post-sale entity is distinct from pre-sale entity).
66. See Delverde Redetermination, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining the focus
of inquiry regarding subsidies).
67. See id. at 14-15 (stating that Delverde can be considered a "continuous
business entity," and thus still liable for subsidies before sale). Delverde's liability
was based on the fact that operations continued in "substantially the same manner
before and after the change in ownership." Id. at 15; see also ILVA
Redetermination, supra note 15, at 13: Usinor Redetermination, supra note 15, at
23; AST Redetermination. supra note 15. at 14 (examining privatization
transactions and determining that all three companies are not distinct from pre-sale
entities; thus, privatized companies are liable for prior non-recurring subsidies).
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the post-sale Delverde was essentially the same "operation" as the
pre-sale Delverde. 68 Thus, post-sale Delverde was liable for subsidies
given to pre-sale Delverde even though post-sale Delverde never
received any subsidies.69 In its analysis, however, Commerce
completely disregarded (1) whether the transaction occurred at
arm's-length and (2) the fact that the new owners of Delverde paid
fair market value for the business entity. Such inquiry would indicate
whether the new owner derived a "benefit," as is required to
determine the existence of a subsidy.70
Although the CIT will consider the Final Redetermination filed by
Commerce in the near future, it has not yet scheduled further
consideration of the issue.7' This development does not bode well for
resolving this issue on the international stage. Moreover, in the
British Steel Panel Decision, the WTO found that the GIA
methodology,72 which Commerce has applied without change in both
pre-URAA73 and post-URAA74 contexts, is inconsistent with the
68. See Delverde Redetermination, supra note 14, at 15; see also British Steel
Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.70 (rejecting the United States' argument
that "operations of [United Engineering Steels Limited] and [British Steel plc] are
essentially the same as the operations of [British Steel Corporation]" because the
privatized entities are distinct from pre-privatized entities due to "payment of
consideration for productive assets" acquired from pre-privatized entity). The
Panel Decision continues by saying that consideration paid should raise the
possibility that the privatized entity no longer enjoys a "benefit." See id.
69. See Steel-Related Redeterminations, supra note 15 (finding a subsidy in
privatization transactions of several steel companies).
70. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B), (E) (1994) (requiring a financial contribution
and a benefit before finding that a subsidy exists under United States law).
71. Commerce and Delverde settled this matter in April 2001, after Delverde
Redetermination, so that duties were reduced by amount of alleged subsidies prior
to privatization. However, Commerce did not acknowledge any flaws in its
change-of-ownership methodology. See U.S. Customs Instruction Letter from Paul
Schwartz, Director, Trade Enforcement and Control to Directors of Field
Operations and Port Directors (Apr. 23, 2001) (on file with author) (regarding
liquidation instructions for certain pasta from Italy produced and/or exported by
Delerde). Thereafter, the Final Redeterminations in the various steel cases were
submitted to CIT, and the litigation has proceeded before the CIT, with parties in
the midst of briefing issues as of this writing.
72. See GIA, supra note 41, at 37,259-65 (discussing privatization
methodology).
73. See Saarstahl, 78 F.3d at 1543 & n.l (noting application of pre-URAA law
where Congress does not give guidance to resolve privatization issue).
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United States' obligations under the WTO Subsidies Agreement."
Thus, the step back to the pre-GIA methodology76 in the Delverde
Final Redetermination,77 which assumes a complete pass through of
subsidies to a newly privatized entity, does not seem likely to gain
acceptance by United States trading partners.
The international debate is certain to continue in light of
Commerce's recent final redeterminations.79  The European
Commission has already requested consultations on United States
Countervailing Duty Orders on several privatized entities.' Thus, the
change-of-ownership provision promulgated via the URAA persists
and the question of whether the URAA codified the WTO Subsidies
Agreement in a way that is consistent with its obligations remains."s
74. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1366 (applying URAA statute, which prohibits a
per se rule assuming pass through of subsidies with change-of-ownership).
75. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.86 (finding the
United States in violation of its WTO Subsidies Agreement Article 10 obligations).
76. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (explaining that this
methodology completely disregards whether there was a fair market value change-
of-ownership transaction).
77. See supra note 14 (describing privatization] change-of-ownership
methodology after the Federal Circuit's June 2000 decision).
78. See Status of Dispute Settlement, supra note 2, para. Vl!(78) (alleging the
United States' violation of WTO commitments based on continued application of
the change-of-ownership methodology, otherwise known as GIA methodology).
79. See supra notes 14-15 (noting Commerce's application of a new
methodology in Delverde and several steel cases in response to the CIT's remand
order).
80. See Status of Dispute Settlement, supra note 2, para. VII(72), at 40
(asserting United States' violation of WTO commitments based on continued
application of the change-of-ownership methodology). The United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") requested comments on the EC's allegations. See WTO
Consultations Regarding Countervailing Duty Measures Concerning Certain
Products from the European Communities, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,336 (Dec. 6, 2000). As
of February 15, 2001, The Stainless Steel Industry of North America, Inc.
("SSINA") and New World Pasta, Inc. had filed comments. See Letter from Eric
R. McClafferty, Esq., Collier Shannon Scott, PLLC, to Sandy McKinzy, USTR
Office of the General Counsel 4 (Jan. 16, 2001) (on file with the author)
(explaining the EC complaint is moot since in the aftermath of Delverde
Commerce has "replaced" the methodology used in the countervailing duty orders
cited by the EC); id. at 6-7 (suggesting EC reliance on the British Steel Panel
Decision is misguided because that decision was limited to the facts of that case).
81. See Codevilla, supra note 8, at 462 (arguing that URAA amendments
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It is instructive to examine the overall development of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement and the provisions of this Agreement at issue,
in order to highlight the conflict between current application of"
United States countervailing duty law and the United States'
international obligations.
II. THE WTO SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT: UNITED
STATES' INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
The WTO Subsidies Agreement is the culmination of great effort
and much debate over the development of a multilateral agreement
addressing the issue of subsidies, their effect on trade, and legal
responses to subsidized goods by individual countries, otherwise
referred to as countervailing duty laws."2 Nations first addressed the
subject of subsidies in a multilateral context in the original GATT of'
1947.83 The major international agreements relevant to the
regarding change-of-ownership and benefit to recipient are inconsistent with the
WTO Subsidies Agreement).
82. See generalh' JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 279-303
(MIT Press, 2d ed. 1997) (discussing the economic effect of subsidies and
evolution of current international subsidies disciplines); M. Jean Anderson &
Gregory Husisian, The Subsidies Agreement, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR TIlE 21ST CENTURY AND
U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 299 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996)
(summarizing the multilateral subsidies system pre-Uruguay, outlining United
States negotiating objectives in the Uruguay Round with respect to subsidies, and
describing the WTO Subsidies Agreement, including codification of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement in United States law); NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6,
at 809-1007 (reviewing various approaches to refining the multilateral subsidies
disciplines pre-Uruguay and various proposals during Uruguay negotiations);
Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The GATT Rules Jbr Industrial Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties and the New GA TT Round - The Weather and the Seeds, in
5 THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 219-35 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 2d
1990) (noting economic backdrop when Uruguay Round negotiations on subsidies
began and describing problems with 1979 Subsidies Code).
83. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfbr signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-Il , T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, arts. II (para. 4), VI. XVI
[hereinafter GATT 1947]; JACKSON, supra note 82, at 285-86 (1997) (observing
that the GATT 1947 treatment of subsidies was limited, but included permission to
use countervailing duties, a reporting requirement, and a general obligation to
refrain from imposing subsidies, which inhibited trade); NEGOTIATING HISTORY,
supra note 6, at 813-15 (noting that Article VI addressed imposition of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, while Article XVI outlined general obligations
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development of multilateral subsidies regimes, after 1947, are the
1979 GATT Subsidies Code ("1979 Subsidies Code")' and the
current regime embodied in the WTO Subsidies Agreement."
A. THE BEGINNING: 1979 SUBSIDIES CODE
After the original GATT of 1947, the next comprehensive
treatment of subsidies came in the Tokyo Round GATT negotiations,
which resulted in the 1979 Subsidies Code. " During the Tokyo
Round, the United States advocated stricter rules to govern the use of
subsidies, but many other participants were reluctant to restrain their
abilities to use domestic subsidies." Instead, these other participants
focused on restraining the United States' ability to use countervailing
duties.8 One criticism of the 1979 Subsidies Code was that it did not
regarding subsidies and in particular focused on export subsidies). Prior to 1947,
bilateral treaties addressed the subsidies issue. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 285.
84. See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the GATT, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 57 (1980)
[hereinafter 1979 Subsidies Code] (outlining rules for international subsidies
regime).
85. See generally WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note II (outlining
multilateral subsidies discipline).
86. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 288-89 (explaining that the 1979 Subsidies
Code addressed international rules on how governments should implement their
countervailing duty laws); id. (outlining international obligations with respect to
subsidies, such as commitments to refrain from imposing export subsidies and
general statements regarding valid policy objectives of domestic subsidies);
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 817 (explaining that the United States
agreed to use the material injury test in its application of countervailing duty
investigations of products from countries that agreed to be bound by the 1979
Subsidies Code in return for the more comprehensive treatment of subsidies in the
Agreement).
87. See NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 816 (stating that many
countries believed rules regarding subsidies would infringe on "internal policy
matters"); see also id. at 815 n.26 (citing 1984 report, which found significant
increases in the use of subsidies as a percentage of GDP by European countries).
88. See id. at 815-16 (suggesting that economic conditions were influencing
parties' reluctance to restrain subsidies), see also S. REP. No. 96-249, at 40-41
(1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 426-27 (recognizing that the United
States' primary motivation in the Tokyo negotiations was to impose -greater
discipline" on trading partners using subsidies, while trading partners sought
adoption of the material injury test into United States countervailing duty law).
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specifically define the term subsidy.8 9 Until the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, a subsidy was defined in general terms with an
"illustrative" list of export subsidies and ambiguous language
regarding "subsidies other than export subsidies," or in other words,
domestic subsidies.
90
B. WTO SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT: DEFINING A SUBSIDY
The WTO Subsidies Agreement, which became effective in
1995,91 was the result of many years of tough negotiations during the
Uruguay Round.9 The WTO Subsidies Agreement is important
because, unlike the 1979 Subsidies Code, it includes a general
definition for a "subsidy" 93 and it is mandatory for all WTO
89. See Bourgeois, supra note 82, at 228 (suggesting that lack of a subsidy
definition made realization of a consensus difficult in negotiating future
refinements of the 1979 Subsidies Code); see also NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra
note 6, at 847 (noting that the subsidy definition was a major unresolved issue in
the Tokyo Round that needed to be addressed during the Uruguay Round).
90. See 1979 Subsidies Code, supra note 84, art. 11, annex at 80-82 (listing
prohibited export subsidies); see also Klaus Kautzor-Schroder, Subsidies andI
Countervail in the Uruguay Round. A Comment, in 5 THE NEW GATT ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, supra
note 82, at 237-38 (noting a correlation between ambiguities of the 1979 Subsidies
Code and the high incidence of disputes and panel proceedings).
91. See WTO Annual Report 2000, supra note 6, at 44 (noting the effective
date of the WTO Subsidies Agreement was January 1, 1995).
92. See NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 833-34 (observing that global
economic recessions of the 1980s led to increased trade tensions, especially in the
area of subsidies, and the growing recognition in the early 1980s that subsidies
would have to be a priority in the next negotiating round); see also id. at 844-45
(recognizing the United States' interest in the issue driven by an overall belief that
subsidies were trade distorting, while other participants saw subsidies as a
legitimate economic policy tool and sought to restrain the United States'
countervailing duty investigations); id. at 861, 863 (noting that the United States
proposal for subsidy definition included benefits to recipient, whereas the EC
proposal for the same definition included a benefit to the recipient that resulted in a
net cost to the government). The language ultimately appears to reflect the former
approach. Id; see id. at 872-73 (describing the United States position supporting
the elimination of domestic subsidies as contentious); See id. at 875 (considering
subsidies negotiations among the "most difficult" within the Uruguay Round).
93. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1. Article 1. 1 states:
a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(l) there is a financial contribution by
a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to
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members.94 Although this agreement was modeled on the 1979
Subsidies Code, it is broader in scope.95 More importantly, WTO
members may enforce this agreement through the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism.96 The WTO Subsidies Agreement provides
comprehensive rules in the subsidies area. 7
in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: (i) a government practice
involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion),
potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii)
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.
fiscal incentives such as tax credits) [footnote omitted]; (iii) a government
provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases
goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or
entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of
functions illustrated in (i) or (iii) above which would normally be vested in
the government and the practice in no real sense differs from practices
normally followed by governments: or (a)(2) there is any form of income or
price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994: and (b) a benefit is
thereby conferred.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. See Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted in Uruguay Round
Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of
Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 910 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,
4228 [hereinafter SAA] (explaining how the WTO Subsidies Agreement improved
on the 1979 Subsidies Code). Cf. JACKSON, supra note 82, at 290 (stating that at
the end of GATT's existence and the end of the Uruguay Round only twenty-four
countries had ratified the 1979 Subsidies Code).
95. See generally Anderson & Husisian, supra note 82, at 309 (remarking that
the WTO Subsidies Agreement dramatically expanded types of prohibited
subsidies by making all export subsidies - previously limited to particular types of
products - and import substitution per se inconsistent with signatories'
obligations).
96. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11. art. 30 & n.35 (providing
that the Agreement is subject to a dispute settlement mechanism, and noting that
national countervailing duty investigations may parallel WTO enforcement
actions, but members are limited to one remedy): see also Anderson & Husisian,
supra note 82, at 303, 310 (noting the importance of enforcing subsidies
disciplines through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and providing an
overview of the dispute settlement process under the WTO Subsidies Agreement).
97. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 290 (stating that the \VTO Subsidies
Agreement effectively replaced the 1979 Subsidies Code because of its extensive
and detailed treatment of the subsidies issue); see also STAFF OF HouSE CO.IM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF UNITED
STATES TRADE STATUTES 59, 61-65 (Comm. Print 1997) (discussing highlights of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, including the red, yellow, and green light
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The WTO Subsidies Agreement contains five major parts and is
divided into two subject areas: (1) general international obligations
(Parts I, II, III, IV) regarding different types of subsidies; and (2)
disciplines for national countervailing duty laws (Part V).98 Part I of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement defines the term "subsidy" and
requires that the subsidy be specific to a "certain enterprise" in order
to qualify as prohibited, actionable, or subject to national
countervailing duty laws. 99 Part II outlines prohibited or so-called
"red light" subsidies, which generally include export subsidies and
import substitution policies. 00 Part II also references Annex I as an
"illustrative list," but not necessarily a complete list, of prohibited
subsidies.'0 ' The majority of subsidies, however, fall within the
approaches to distinguishing between types of subsidies).
98. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note II (setting forth the two-part
structure of the Agreement); see also WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures: Overview, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/scme/scm.htm (May
20, 1998) (outlining the structure and coverage of the Agreement, general
categories of subsidies, and requirements for countervailing measures). Other parts
of the WTO Subsidies Agreement include: (1) provisions establishing a Committee
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures within the WTO (art. 24); (2)
provisions requiring members to notify the WTO regarding specific subsidies so
that these subsidies may be evaluated (arts. 25-26); (3) rules for developing
countries, which require phasing out export subsidies and import substitution
policies (i.e., subsidies contingent on using domestic inputs over imported goods)
(art. 27); and (4) provisions for countries making transition from centrally planned
to market economies (arts. 28-29). WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note II. The
WTO Subsidies Agreement addresses privatization only in Article 27.13, which
states that debt forgiveness and "subsidies to cover social costs," when used on a
non-recurring basis and when "directly linked" to privatization of enterprises, will
not be actionable for developing countries. Id. art. 27.13.
99. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11. art. 2 (explaining the
circumstances under which objective criteria for eligibility as a subsidy, articulated
in law or regulation and verifiable, will not be considered specific to "certain
enterprise"); see also JACKSON, supra note 82, at 296 (explaining that a subsidy is
not specific where it is generally available for use by all exporters and noting that
the specificity concept was first articulated in United States law); see also
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 819-20 (indicating that Tokyo Round
negotiators discussed the idea of a specific definition for subsidy but the general
consensus was that a definition would be "either under- or over-inclusive").
100. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, arts. 3, 4 (stating "subsidies
contingent, in law or ... upon export performance" are unlawful under this
Agreement) (footnote omitted).
101. See id. annex I, at 262 (listing twelve examples of prohibited subsidies,
including direct subsidies from the government contingent on exporting, tax breaks
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"yellow light" category, outlined in Part I.102 Part IV describes the
so-called "green light" or legal subsidies. '.
Finally, if a country chooses to utilize countervailing duty
measures in response to illegal subsidies, Part V outlines guidelines
for administering countervailing duty laws."° Part V does not include
any rules specific to the privatization situation.0's WTO members
who have codified these provisions into their national laws have
implemented the Agreement to varying degrees, but the United
States codified these provisions through the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act in 1994. 106
related to exports, government provided export credit guarantees, or insurance
programs).
102. See id. arts. 5, 6, & 7 (providing that subsidies that have "adverse effects"
on other members or cause "serious prejudice" are grounds for members to request
consultations under auspices of the WTO); see also JACKSON, supra note 82, at
292 (suggesting this is a "residual" category, of all things not provided for in the
strictly prohibited subsidies).
103. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note II, art. 8 (listing legal
subsidies subject to certain criteria, including subsidies for research assistance,
assistance to disadvantaged regions, and assistance for environmental adaptation);
id. art. 31 (sun-setting so called "green light" (i.e., legal) subsidies as of December
1999); SAA, supra note 94, at 917 (explaining that Congress agreed to limited
legal subsidies as long as such subsidies meet strict criteria). United States Trade
Representative and Department of Commerce. Subsidies Etiforcement ..lnnual
Report to Congress, pt. B at I at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/esel/reports/seo2000/report2k.htnIl (Feb. 2000) (explaining
that the WTO Subsidies Committee failed to reach consensus on whether or how to
extend "green light" subsidy provisions, therefore, provisions expired Jan. 1,
2000).
104. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11. arts. 10-23 (providing rules
for initiating investigations, gathering evidence, and deternining and imposing
injuries; providing "guidelines" for assessing whether a benefit has been conferred;
and incorporating Article VI of GATT 1994). See generall' Anderson & Husisian,
supra note 82, at 304-05 (describing the general outline of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement).
105. Cf WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.13 (noting that
subsidies directly linked to privatization and given in a developing country may
not be actionable under the Agreement).
106. See URAA, supra note 32 (codifying the Uruguay Round Agreements into
United States law).
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C. HARMONIZING UNITED STATES LAW WITH THE WTO SUBSIDIES
AGREEMENT
Generally, the WTO Subsidies Agreement is considered a
negotiating success for the United States because it strengthens
subsidy disciplines and generally reflects United States
countervailing duty law. 0 7 Congress harmonized United States law
with the WTO Subsidies Agreement through the 1994 URAA. "ll The
URAA did not make wholesale changes to United States law, but
Congress did make some important changes to reflect United States
obligations under the WTO Subsidies Agreement. 09 The URAA
replaced an arguably ambiguous subsidy definition in United States
law" with the subsidy definition from the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, imposing a few clarifications. I'
107. See Anderson & Husisian, supra note 82, at 303 (describing WTO
Subsidies Agreement as "a major negotiating victory" for the United States); see
also id. at 299 (explaining the breakthrough nature of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement in relation to 1979 Subsidies Code).
108. See URAA, supra note 32 (codifying the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement,
which included the WTO Subsidies Agreement).
109. See Anderson & Husisian, supra note 82, at 329-37 (detailing changes in
United States countervailing duty law). New provisions were added to (I)
coordinate United States countervailing duty investigations with WTO
enforcement actions and (2) strictly monitor WTO members' use of "green light"
subsidies. Id. Changes to United States countervailing duty law included: (I)
general definition of subsidy; (2) specificity standards; (3) injury test for all WTO
members; and (4) rules requiring "sunset reviews" of pre-existing orders to limit
duration of countervailing duty orders. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-826(l), at
106-27 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3880-99 (explaining various
provisions of URAA implementing the WTO Subsidies Agreement).
110. See Codevilla, supra note 8, at 439 (suggesting ambiguity in the pre-URAA
subsidy definition, which considered a subsidy to have the same meaning as
"bounty or grant," but neither bounty nor grant was defined in the statute), see also
Andoh, supra note 35, at 1523 (discussing early case law regarding subsidy
definition, which tended to define the term broadly and found subsidy to exist
where "something of value was given to a foreign company").
111. See SAA, supra note 94, at 912-13 (noting that "guidelines" for assessing
"benefit" are expressed in Article 14 of WTO Subsidies Agreement, which,
according to the United States, reflects benefit-to-recipient methodology, as
opposed to net cost-to-government methodology that others, including the EC.
support in negotiations); Mark D. Herlach & David Codevilla, Major Changes in
U.S. Countervailhng Duty Law: A Guide to the Basics, 722 PLI/CORP 53, 58-63
(1995) (describing provisions of URAA implementing the WTO Subsidies
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The changes to URAA sections 771(5)(C)" 2 regarding "other
factors," 771(5)(E)1 3 regarding benefit, and 771(5)(F)"' regarding
change-of-ownership are most relevant to the discussion in this
Comment. Section 771(5)(C) clarifies that Commerce is not required
to consider the effect of a subsidy in determining whether a subsidy
exists. 1 5 Section 771(5)(E) seems to codify Article 14 of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, which describes how to determine a benefit.'
6
While section 771(5)(E) lists the same basic factors as Article 14 for
determining when a benefit is conferred," 7 a subtle change exists in
Agreement definition of subsidy).
112. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C) (1994) (noting that a subsidy can be direct or
indirect and clarifying that Commerce is not required to "'consider the effect of a
subsidy in determining whether a subsidy exists").
113. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E) (1994) (stating that "a benefit shall normally be
treated as conferred .... ").
114. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (1994) (indicating that a change-of-ownership
is not a sufficient ground to assume that a prior subsidy no longer is
countervailable, even if the change occurred via an arm's-length transaction); see
also Codevilla, supra note 8, at 461-62 (observing that drafters of the change-of-
ownership amendment, who generally represented domestic steel and lumber
industries, pushed the amendment to address 1994 CIT cases, which held that fair
market value change-of-ownership transactions extinguish benefit of prior non-
recurring subsidies). Codevilla, who was a Senate staffer at time of the URAA
drafting, also notes that there was little debate or understanding of implications of
this amendment by members of Congress. Id.
115. See SAA, supra note 94, at 926 (noting Administration's intent that "a new
definition of subsidy does not require that Commerce consider or analyze the effect
of a government action on the price or output of the class or kind of merchandise
under investigation or review."); see also Rushford, supra note 35, at 492
(explaining that administration of United States countervailing duty law is a
"multiagency, multistep process" in which Commerce makes the threshold
determination of whether or not a subsidy exists).
116. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E)(i), (iv) (1994) (describing situations where
benefit is conferred to include terms "inconsistent with usual investment practices
of private investors" or where goods or services are "provided for less than
adequate remuneration"); WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 14
(explaining that a government-provided equity or loan, etc. 'shall not be
considered as conferring a benefit, unless" in situations where provision is
inconsistent with commercial terms or usual investment practice); see also H.R.
REP. No. 103-826(I), at 109, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3881 (noting
the congressional view that this provision is consistent with the WTO Subsidies
Agreement and reflects the benefit-to-recipient standard long supported by the
United States).
117. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11. art. 14 (listing the types of
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the language of United States law that presumes a benefit unless
proven otherwise."18 Section 771(5)(F) clarifies that selling a
business entity in an arm's-length transaction is not determinative on
the question of whether prior subsidies conferred have been
extinguished. ' 9
In the aftermath of URAA and after three years of debate, "
Commerce promulgated final countervailing duty rules to reflect
changes in the law.' 2' Commerce received many comments on the
privatization issue, specifically regarding the new change-of-
ownership provision, but Commerce ultimately retained the status
quo GIA methodology for applying countervailing duty law in the
privatization context.12 2  Commerce's interpretation of what is
required under the URAA and the WTO Subsidies Agreement in
defining a subsidy is a source of conflict among the United States
and the WTO's recent British Steel Panel Decision.2 3 Thus, it is
important to analyze the subsidy definition under the WTO Subsidies
transactions that will confer a benefit).
118. See Herlach & Codevilla, supra note 11l, at 61-62 (arguing that Article 14
language does not presume a benefit is conferred). Article 14 presumes there is no
benefit unless a financial contribution is given on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations. Id. In other words, a benefit exists if a loan is given at
below market terms or an equity infusion is made without consideration for market
value. Id. In contrast, URAA language implementing Article 14 begins with the
presumption that there is a benefit unless respondent proves otherwise. i.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826(l), at 110 (recognizing that privatization is a
"complex and multifaceted" transaction and directing Commerce to exercise
discretion by considering facts of each case).
120. See Comments on the Proposed CVD Regulations (1997), at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/cvd-cmts/ (June 6, 1997) (listing several sets of comments
from various parties dated June and December 1997).
121. See Final Rule Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348, 65,348-65,418
(Nov. 25, 1998) (outlining changes in countervailing duty regulations).
122. See id. at 65,355 (stating reluctance to codify a privatization methodology
and apparently deferring to the courts' future interpretation of law to validate or
reject commenters' suggested methodologies). Commerce further stated "rapidly
changing economic conditions around the world, particularly with respect to state
ownership" indicate it would be prudent to allow further policy development on
the privatization issue. Id.
123. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.85 (Finding that
Commerce did not construe "benefit" as intended under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, thus Commerce's methodology did not sufficiently demonstrate
existence of a subsidy).
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Agreement and discuss the potential ambiguity in this definition.
III. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
WTO SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT
Trade negotiators have long focused on reducing tariff barriers and
have largely succeeded in that area throughout the various trade
rounds since the founding of GATT in 1947.2' The more difficult
task for trade negotiators, which began in earnest in Tokyo in 1979,
has been to address non-tariff barriers to trade, such as subsidies. 2
The subsidies issue, first addressed on a multilateral basis in the 1979
Subsidies Code, was part of the Uruguay Round negotiations. -'26 By
the end of the Uruguay Round, trade negotiators were successful in
establishing a viable framework for addressing trade-distorting
mechanisms like subsidies.
27
A. WTO SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT: ASSESSMENT
In general, through the WTO Subsidies Agreement, the United
States has achieved its objective of creating an effective mechanism
to control foreign subsidies.' 28 The United States has won WTO
124. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OPEN MARKETS MATTER:
THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALISATION 31 (OECD ed., 1998)
(noting reduction of tariffs from an average of forty percent in 1947 to an average
of four percent after Uruguay Round). The OECD Report emphasizes the
correlation of market-oriented economic policies and liberalization of trade and
investment with increasing economic growth. Id.
125. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 279-85 (discussing economic and political
aspects of subsidies in international trade). The unique achievement of the
Uruguay Round is that it expanded the scope of the international rules-based
trading system beyond tariff reduction to non-tariff barriers such as subsidies. /d. at
305.
126. See id. at 290 (explaining that the subsidies agreement that emerged from
Uruguay Round utilized a conceptual framework first proposed in Tokyo).
127. See Anderson & Husisian. supra note 82, at 299 (emphasizing
improvements in WTO Subsidies Agreement over the 1979 Subsidies Code).
128. See Richard 0. Cunningham. Commentary on the First Five Years of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement and Agreement on Subsidies and Counterailing
Measures, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 897, 904 (2000) (noting the United States'
success with WTO Subsidies Agreement and raising the question why more United
States companies do not pursue complaints under this agreement). But see Paul C.
Rosenthal & Robert T.C. Vermylen, The T17O -Antidumping and Subsidies
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cases in which the country alleged WTO Subsidies Agreement
violations. 29 Further, in the Canadian Aircraft Panel Decision, the
WTO validated the United States' long held benefit-to-recipient
standard for finding a subsidy. 3' The difficulties negotiators face in
defining a subsidy, however, continue with application of the subsidy
definition in WTO disputes regarding the Subsidies Agreement.'
The WTO Subsidies Agreement has been the subject of a number
of disputes before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, including
those concerning the definition of a subsidy and related issues under
the Agreement. 3 2 These decisions begin the process of testing the
Agreements: Did the United States Achieve its Objectives During the Urugluia
Round, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 871, 885 (describing British Steel Panel
Decision as "disturbing" because it did not defer to Commerce's finding and
requires Commerce to conduct "a new analysis of how the subsidies benefit new
owners of a firm" with each change-of-ownership). Rosenthal and Vermylen argue
there is a need for further interpretation of the WTO Subsidies Agreement. Id. at
872.
129. See WTO Panel Report on Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, WT/DS55/R, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/distab-e (July 2, 1998); WTO Panel
Report on Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of'
Automotive Leather, WT/DS 126/R, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distab_e (May 25, 1999). The United
States initiated twelve of the completed cases where panel reports were issued and
won the two cases it initiated regarding the WTO Subsidies Agreement. See Status
of Dispute Settlement, supra note 2, para. VIII A (listing completed WTO cases
where the panel issued a decision).
130. See WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export
of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R para. 156 (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter
Canada-Aircraft Appellate Body Report] (stating determination of the cost to
government is not an element for deciding whether there has been a benefit); see
also JOINT REP. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE AND COM. DEP'T: SUBSIDIES
ENFORCEMENT ANN. REP. TO CONG. 23, at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/esel/reports/seo200l/report200 l.html (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter
Subsidies Enforcement Annual Report] (confirming the United States approach to
determining subsidy, which is to ask "whether the recipient received something on
better-than-market terms," versus what the subsidy cost the government).
13 1. See Canada-Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 130, para. 154
(Aug. 20, 1999) (stating that a benefit is present when someone can receive and
use the benefit); id. para. 155 (asserting a link between a benefit as described in
Article 14 and as used in Article 1.1(b)).
132. See Status of Dispute Settlement, supra note 2 (reporting the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body has heard twenty-five distinct matters related to the WTO
Subsidies Agreement).
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consensus that negotiators reached in the Uruguay Round.'" The
heart of the dispute in a countervailing duty investigation of a
privatized entity is the question of when a subsidy exists."' Before
turning to a specific dispute regarding the subsidy definition, one
must understand what the consensus was regarding the definition of a
subsidy at the end of the Uruguay Round.
B. WTO SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT DEFINES A SUBSIDY
As mentioned earlier, an important breakthrough in negotiations
accompanied acknowledgement of a general definition of a
subsidy.'35 The WTO Subsidies Agreement subsidy definition
requires a finding of a direct or indirect financial contribution by a
government actor and a benefit subsequently conferred.'36 This
definition remains ambiguous, however, because the WTO Subsidies
Agreement does not explicitly define the "benefit" requirement of
the subsidy definition.'37 The WTO Subsidies Agreement leaves part
of the subsidy definition ambiguous perhaps in part because a more
specific definition in theory would limit the discretion of national
133. Cf Guy de Jonquieres, Europe Breaks T1O Rules on Anti-dumping, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001; Edward Alden & Frances Williams, T17o Orders U.S.
Dumping Law to Change, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001; Frances Williams, Censure
for U.S. Over Steel Duties, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001 [hereinafter Recent WTO
Anti-dumping Decisions] (illustrating several cases where the consensus reached
on the WTO anti-dumping agreement is being tested and where the United States
and the EC have been on the losing end of Panel decisions).
134. See Anderson & Husisian, supra note 82, at 301 (listing as one of the
primary goals of American negotiators during the Uruguay Round better
recognition of when a subsidy exists).
135. See id. at 305 (noting that Tokyo negotiators did not reach a consensus on
subsidy definition, and instead hoped that an international consensus would
"evolve in practice").
136. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1. This definition is
not unlike the definition codified in United States law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(B)
(1994) (requiring a financial contribution and a benefit conferred for a subsidy
determination to exist).
137. See Anderson & Husisian, supra note 82, at 306 (explaining that "benefit"
is not explicitly defined, while "financial contribution" is defined in the
Agreement); compare WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1(a)
(listing four examples of financial contributions) with \\rO Subsidies Agreement,
supra note 11, art. 1.1(b) (stating without clarification, "and a benefit is thereby
conferred").
2001]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
agencies that administer countervailing duty laws. 3 '
The key to the privatization question is clarifying the second part
of the subsidy definition regarding benefit.'39 Specifically, the
question remains as to how to measure the conferral of a benefit, if
any, to a newly privatized entity that received a subsidy before
privatization, but has not received a subsidy as a private entity.
Application of the subsidy definition answers the threshold question
of whether there is an actionable subsidy subject to countervailing
duties or dispute settlement. 40 Although the WTO Agreement is not
clear on how to define a benefit,'4' the "benefit" component of the
subsidy definition could be defined by reference to Article 14 of the
WTO Subsidies Agreement.
42
Article 14 provides "guidelines" for calculating the "Amount of
Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient."'' 14  These
guidelines begin with the presumption that there is no benefit unless
the equity infusion, loan, loan guarantee, provision of goods and
services, or purchase of goods and services occurs on terms
138. See Codevilla, supra note 8, at 439 (suggesting, in the case of pre-URAA
United States law, that an ambiguous subsidy definition gave greater discretion to
administering agencies, resulting in "inconsistent and economically questionable
definitions of subsidies.").
139. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1 (giving some
clarification on "financial contribution" but no clarification on second part of
subsidy definition "benefit").
140. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105rTh CONG.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF UNITED STATES TRADE STATUTES 59 (Comm.
Print 1997) (discussing application of United States countervailing duty law).
141. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1(b) (linking
conferral of a benefit to government financial contribution in the definition of a
subsidy).
142. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 14 (describing
permissible calculation of subsidy amount "in terms of the benefit to the
recipient"); see also Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, The 1994 WTO Subsidies
Agreement, 863 PLI/CORP 683, 705 (1994) (stating Article 14 is the "only Article
to provide guidance on the measurement of a benefit conferred by actionable
subsidies for countervailing duty purposes.").
143. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 1I, art. 14 (establishing four
guidelines, which generally set forth commercial benchmarks used to measure the
benefit conferred to recipient); see also SAA, supra note 94, at 912 (equating the
definition of benefit in Article 14 with the benefit required in Article 1. 1(b) general
subsidy definition).
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inconsistent with commercial or market-based terms.'" These
guidelines suggest that an arm's length transaction between unrelated
parties, each acting in its own interest and who negotiate and arrive
at a fair market value price, would not confer a benefit because the
new owners paid for all they received." 5
In order to understand how the WTO Dispute Panel applies the
defmition of a subsidy in the privatization context and whether a
benefit passes through to the new owner, Part IV analyzes a specific
case. In British Steel, the WTO Dispute Panel rejected Commerce's
methodology for applying the subsidy definition in the privatization
context and held that a benefit cannot be presumed in a privatization
situation.1
46
IV. CASE STUDY: BRITISH STEEL
In the British Steel case, the WTO Dispute Panel found the
privatization methodology used by Commerce in countervailing duty
investigations inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
the WTO Subsidies Agreement. 4 7 While the British Steel case was
pending before the WTO, a sunset review"4 ' of the countervailing
duty order at issue resulted in its revocation.'49 Subsequently, the
144. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 14(a)-(d) (listing
"guidelines" for determining existence of a benefit).
145. See Codevilla, supra note 8. at 455 (arguing that no benefit can exist where
the terms of a commercial transaction between a private entity and the government
are consistent with normal commercial terms).
146. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, paras. 6.70-.71 (stating that
change-of-ownership should have prompted Commerce to examine whether
production by new owners was subsidized).
147. See id. para. 6.85 (finding Commerce's methodology did not establish
whether or not the respondent received a benefit).
148. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MlAXNS, 105TI CONG.,
OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF UNITED STATES TRADE STATUTI:S 59, 76-77
(Comm. Print 1997) (describing a provision of Uruguay Round Agreement, which
requires termination of a countervailing duty order after five years unless the
agency finds that expiration will likely lead to continuation or recurrence of
subsidies).
149. See Sunset Review: Final Results of Reviews and Revocation, 64 Fed. Reg.
61,821 (Nov. 15, 1999) (revoking countervailing duty order effective January 1,
2000 because no domestic party responded to sunset review notice).
2001]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
United States reported to the WTO that no further action was
necessary to comply with the Dispute Panel's final ruling."" The
European Comission's ("EC") recent challenges to twelve United
States countervailing duty orders against EC imports 5' and several
steel/privatization related cases pending before the CIT 52 indicate
that litigation over the subsidies issue will continue. In light of these
pending cases, it is instructive to analyze the WTO Dispute Panel's
application of the subsidy definition in the British Steel decision. The
following discussion describes the privatization transaction and the
countervailing duty investigation at issue in British Steel.
A. BRITISH STEEL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In order to give context to this dispute, a brief history on the
companies whose products were subject to countervailing duties is
necessary. United Engineering Steels Limited ("UES"), and British
Steel plc ("BSplc"), later renamed British Steel Engineering Steels
("BSES"), had a prior relationship with state-owned British Steel
Corporation ("BSC"). 53 In 1986, state-owned BSC and privately
150. See Subsidies Enforcement Annual Report, supra note 130, at 26 (reporting
that at the WTO meeting of July 5, 2000 the United States noted the British Steel
action was closed since the order was no longer in place).
151. See Status of Dispute Settlement, supra note 2, para. VII(72) (requesting
consultations in November 2000 on the matter of twelve CVD orders against EC,
where Commerce's change-of-ownership methodology was used, and alleging
violations of the WTO Subsidies Agreement). Brazil also requested consultations
on the same issue in December 2000. Id. para. VII(78). During the WTO Dispute
Settlement body meeting of September 10, 2001, the EC requested and received
permission to move the case forward when the WTO agreed to establish a panel to
resolve this dispute. See U.S. Affirms Compliance with WTO Ruling on Korea
Stainless Steel Antidumping Duties, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. II, 2001)
(noting activities of September 10 meeting of WTO Dispute Settlement Body
including EC's request to establish panel to consider twelve U.S. countervailing
duty orders imposed on various steel imports from former state-owned mills in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
152. See Steel-Related Redeterminations, supra note 15 (describing
Commerce's adjustments to prior change-of-ownership determinations and placing
the matter before CIT for further consideration).
153. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, paras. 2.3-2.4 (noting the
relationship between UES and BSplc/BSES and BSC); see also David White,
Productivit, Gains Cannot Stave off Steel's Job Losses, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001,
at 12 (reporting on current developments with respect to British Steel, which
merged with Netherlands-based Hoogovens in 1999 and was renamed Corus).
[17:79
DEL VERDE AND BRITISt STEEL
owned Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds ("GKN") created UES in a joint
venture. 5 4 BSC did receive subsidies before it was privatized in
1988, but the subsequent owners of UES (BSES and BSplc) did not
receive subsidies. "I BSC was privatized through a process wherein
BSplc was created to assume the rights and liabilities of BSC, and
eventually BSplc shares were sold in a transaction "at arm's length,
for fair market value and consistent with commercial considerations"
to complete the process. 5 6 In 1995, BSplc bought out GKN's interest
in UES and renamed UES British Steel Engineering Steels
("BSES").
157
The United States first imposed the countervailing duty order at
issue in 1993.158 Subsequent Administrative Reviews of this order in
1995, 1996, and 1997 resulted in the continuation of duties on
imports of hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel from UES and
BSES.' 9 Using its GIA methodology, 6' Commerce allocated pre-
privatization subsidies to BSC over a period that included the
creation of UES (1986), privatization of BSplc (1988), and buy-out
of GKN by BSplc for full ownership of UES and renaming of UES
to BSES (1995).' 61 Generally, Commerce applied its change-of-
154. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 2.3 (stating UES was
equally owned by BSplc and GKN, which were both privately owned companies).
155. See id. para. 6.35 (acknowledging BSC did receive a financial contribution,
which conferred a benefit); id. para. 6.23 (noting privatization date). Neither party
who had owned UES received the alleged subsidies, but state-owned BSC did
receive them. Id. para. 2.3.
156. See id. para. 2.3 (describing privatization process and noting both EC and
United States agreed that the transaction was consistent with "commercial
considerations").
157. See id. para. 2.4 (noting change in UES' name to BSES).
158. See Countervailing Duty Order: Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products From the United Kingdom, 58 Fed. Reg. 15,327 (Mar. 22,
1993) (making an affirmative injury determination and authorizing a duty on
imports from United Engineering Steels Limited ("UES") based on 12.69 percent
subsidy rate).
159. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, paras. 2.6-2.9 (noting the
chronology of Administrative Reviews subsequent to original countervailing duty
order).
160. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce
methodology).
161. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.25 (stating
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ownership methodology in the Administrative Reviews and found
that the subsidies provided to BSC "traveled" to UES, and thus a
portion of the benefit passed through to UES and BSplc/BSES.1'
2
The EC subsequently challenged the continued imposition of
countervailing duties by the United States against imports of hot-
rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products from the United
Kingdom.
163
B. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES MAY NOT BE IMPOSED UNLESS A
SUBSIDY EXISTS
In response to the EC's challenge, the Panel said the authority to
impose countervailing duties is conditioned on fulfilling the terms of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, which is explicit in requiring a
subsidy determination consistent with the terms of the Agreement. 6
4
This requirement underlines the overall purpose of the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, which is to offset subsidies.6 5 Article 10 of the
WTO Subsidies Agreement asserts that a WTO member country is
not authorized to impose countervailing duties unless there is a
subsidy to offset. 6 6 Further, Articles 19.1 and 19.4 require a member
Commerce found that BSC received non-recurring subsidies prior to 1986, which
were allocated over a period of fifteen years).
162. See id. paras. 6.26-.30 (stating outcomes of Administrative Reviews and
noting Commerce used a "two-stage" pass through methodology for the 1996
Administrative Review, which covered 1995 imports and BSplc's acquisition of'
UES).
163. See id. paras. 2.1-.2 (noting preliminary facts of dispute).
164. See id. para. 6.57 (stating the cumulative effect of Articles 19.1, 19.4, and
21.1 is to link existence of subsidy with countervailing duty imposition).
165. See id. para. 6.56 (asserting overall purpose of WTO Subsidies Agreement
is to utilize countervailing duties only when necessary to offset subsidies). The EC
argued that the underlying objective of merely offsetting subsidies reflects a
"measured response" that "neutralizes" subsidies without going further. ld.
Attachment 1.1, paras. 90-91. The United States conceded that countervailing
duties are imposed to offset subsidies and not to deter, but the United States
clarified by saying the overall Agreement is intended to deter use of subsidies. I/.
Attachment 2.6, paras. 80-81; Zenith, 437 U.S. at 455-56 (stating the purpose of'
United States countervailing duty law was "to offset the unfair competitive
advantage" imports may enjoy as a result of government subsidies).
166. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 10 (requiring members
to "take all necessary steps" to ensure that countervailing duty investigations are
conducted according to terms of Agreement).
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to answer the threshold question of whether a subsidy exists before
countervailing duties are imposed. 67 Finally, Article 21.1 links the
continuation of a subsidy to persistent imposition of a countervailing
duty.168 Thus, a member country will violate the WTO Subsidies
Agreement if the country imposes a countervailing duty and fails to
demonstrate the existence of a subsidy.' 69 The Panel next asked what
criteria the WTO Subsidies Agreement requires in order to find the
existence of a subsidy.
70
C. CRITERIA FOR FINDING WHETHER A SUBSIDY EXISTS MUST
INCLUDE A BENEFIT
Article 1.1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement requires a financial
contribution by a government actor or a benefit conferred for a
subsidy to exist.' 7' The language of the agreement suggests a causal
link between financial contribution and a benefit. 7"2 The British Steel
Panel, relying on the Canadian Aircraft Panel Decision, found that
the word benefit connotes "some form of advantage" such that the
recipient has a more advantageous position relative to the market,
which it would not have gained but for a financial contribution from
the government. 7 3
167. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.50 (stating Article
19.1 conditions countervailing duties on finding existence of a subsidy and finding
that subsidized imports are causing domestic products injury). The Panel found in
Article 19.4 a "clear nexus" between existence of a subsidy and imposition of
countervailing duties. Id. para. 6.52.
168. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 21.1 (providing "[a]
countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent
necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.").
169. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.47 (explaining that
the country's failure to adhere to the terms of the \'TO Subsidies Agreement when
it imposes a countervailing duty results in an Article 10 violation).
170. See id., para. 6.58 (finding the existence of a subsidy to depend on financial
contribution by a governmental or public body).
171. See WTO Subsidies Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.1 (requiring a
financial contribution or a benefit conferred to find a subsidy).
172. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, Attachment 1. 1, para. 103
(recognizing a causal relationship and stating the EC argument that "'a state-owned
company cannot casually confer a benefit on a privately-owned buyer of assets"
that were once state-owned in an arm's length transaction).
173. See id. paras. 6.64-.66 (finding Canadian Aircraft discussions of benefit
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The Panel also clarified conditions regarding when a benefit is
conferred and to whom or what a benefit is conferred. 74 The Panel
disagreed with the United States' argument for an irrebuttabic
presumption that a benefit is conferred after a change-of-
ownership. 7 5 In addition, the Panel found unpersuasive the United
States' argument that the present tense language of Article 1. 1 limits
the benefit determination to the time that the original subsidy was
bestowed, thus there was no need to reassess the benefit. 7 "
According to the Panel, the benefit and financial contribution must
be found during the investigation period and not exclusively at the
time of the original subsidy.'77 In support of its claim that a
reassessment of benefit was not necessary, the United States argued
that a benefit is conferred upon "manufacture, production or export
of any merchandise" and not necessarily to a specific person.'7
However, the Panel rejected this approach calling it abstract and
illogical, since a recipient must exist in order for a benefit to arise.""
persuasive and holding that determination of a benefit is based on whether "a legal
or natural person, has received a financial contribution on terms more favourable
than those available to the potential recipient or beneficiary in the market."); see
also Canada-Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 130, para. 155 (asserting
that textual reference to Article 1.1 in Article 14 - "benefit to recipient conferred
pursuant to paragraph I of Article " - supports a connection between a benefit
conferred relative to the market).
174. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, paras. 6.64-.79 (discussing
the Panel's interpretation of "benefit").
175. See id. para. 6.71 (finding a presumption of benefit with "successor
companies" potentially rebutted in certain change-of-ownership situations).
176. See id. para. 6.72 (describing the United States' argument, which supported
the idea that benefit need only be found at the time of a financial contribution).
177. See id. paras. 6.73-.74 (rejecting the United States' argument regarding
narrow temporal reading of Articles 1.1 and 14 as inconsistent with the "ordinary
meaning" of the language).
178. See id. para. 6.77 (explaining the United States' reading of Articles 1. 1 and
10 as supporting the view that a "subsidy benefits the manufacture, production or
export of merchandise" as opposed to a legal or natural person).
179. See id. para. 6.78 (arguing benefit must be determined relative to the
recipient and finding the United States approach unworkable); see also id. paras.
6.82-.83 (rejecting the United States' argument drawing a distinction between new
owners and companies for purposes of repayment of subsidies as "elevat[ing] form
over substance"). The WTO panel also cited Commerce's own language in
rejecting this distinction and concluding that money repaid through a fair market
value transaction is fungible. Id. para. 6.83.
[17:79
DEL VERDE AND BRITISH STEEL
When the Panel rejected these arguments, it made it difficult for the
United States to support its finding that there was in fact a benefit,
and therefore a subsidy, existing in the post-privatization entity.
D. PRIVATIZATION CAN ELIMINATE BENEFIT FROM PRIOR NON-
RECURRING SUBSIDIES
The crux of the dispute in the British Steel decision was whether
the United States made its determination regarding the conferral of a
benefit because this is a crucial component in the subsidy
definition.80 The United States argued that UES and then
BSplc/BSES continued to benefit from subsidies conveyed to BSC
prior to privatization.'' Thus, after making the initial subsidy
determination and applying Commerce's change-of-ownership
methodology,12 which allocates the benefit stream over time, there
was neither a need nor a legal requirement to reevaluate this
determination. 183 Indeed, the United States argued that Commerce
appropriately applied United States law, which has an "irrebuttable
presumption" that non-recurring subsidies "benefit merchandise
produced by [the] recipient over time."'84 Further, United States law
180. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.58 n.69 (noting a
lack of EC dispute to the assertion that a "financial contribution" was made to
BSC). The EC conceded that financial contributions to BSC benefited BSC in the
past, but argued that these prior subsidies were not at issue. Id. Attachment 1.1,
paras. 131-32.
181. See id. paras. 6.60-.62 (discussing Commerce findings that the benefit
conferred on BSC by 1985-86 financial contributions passed-through to privatized
entities).
182. See id. Attachment 2.1, para. 50 (stating United States law did not give
guidance on how to calculate a portion of subsidies repaid by change-of-ownership
transaction). The United States said there are significant administrative barriers to
conducting "extensive econometric analysis" to determine repayment amounts,
which was the alternative to the methodology that Commerce eventually adopted.
Id. n.307.
183. See id. Attachment 2.1, para. 107 (explaining the United States' view that
the WTO Subsidies Agreement did not provide guidance on how to address a
change-of-ownership situation). The United States argued that Article 1.1 required
a finding of a benefit "once as of the time of the subsidy bestowal." Id. para. 109;
see also id. para. 111 (indicating Commerce's methodology accorded with
Subsidies Agreement).
184. See id. Attachment 2.1, paras. 43-46 (asserting Commerce's irrebuttable
presumption of benefit and allocation methodology is consistent with WTO). The
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does not require reassessment of the subsidies based on "usc or
effect" or "subsequent events" in the market. 5 In essence, the
United States argued that privatization had little to no impact on a
determination that the privatized entity continued to receive a benefit
and consequently a subsidy, even though the privatized entity never
received a subsidy.'86
In response, the EC argued that the United States "improperly
assumed" a benefit was conveyed to UES and BSplc/BSES by a
previous financial contribution to BSC. 187 The privatized companies
merely bought part or all of a company that had previously received
subsidies in a fair market value transaction. 8' Thus, the United States
never demonstrated the existence of a subsidy because it made an
assumption without acknowledging that an arm's length fair market
value transaction by definition generally ensures the purchaser does
not derive a benefit.1
8 9
United States relied on Annex IV, para. 7 of WTO Subsidies Agreement, which
provides for allocation of subsidy over time, to support its contention that
Commerce's methodology is WTO consistent. Id. para. 44-45. But see Delverde,
202 F.3d at 1367 (determining Commerce's presumption of a benefit is in "direct
conflict" with the statute).
185. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, Attachment 2.1, para. 43
(arguing absence of requirement to reevaluate "use or effect" of subsidies).
Perhaps the United States' analysis confuses the terms "effect" and "benefit" since
the United States statute seems to distinguish between the two terms by defining
them in distinct provisions. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C), (E) (1994). Further, the
United States statute seems to provide for "subsequent events in the marketplace"
with the change-of-ownership provision. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) (allowing
consideration by Commerce of change-of-ownership); see also supra notes 102-
117 and accompanying text (discussing aforementioned provisions in United States
law regarding subsidy term).
186. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, Attachment 2. 1, para. 181
(asserting that the "productive assets" which previously benefited from a subsidy
before privatization are identical to those used by the new owners).
187. See id. Attachment 1.1, para. 133 (arguing Commerce's formula, which
treats fair market price as irrelevant, does not reflect "economic reality"). The EC
argued "price paid necessarily values and incorporates within the transaction any
subsidy previously conferred." Id. para. 50.
188. See id. Attachment 1.1, para. 132 (asserting UES and BSplc, who have not
received subsidies, should not be assessed duties on their products).
189. See id. para. 2.3 (stating both parties agreed that BSplc privatization "was
at arm's length, for fair market value and consistent with commercial
considerations."). The EC argued that "a purchase at fair market value necessarily
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After considering both of these arguments, the Panel found that
the United States failed to establish the conferral of a benefit on UES
and BSplc/BSES.190 The Panel reasoned that consideration paid in
the course of a change-of-ownership should have prompted
Commerce to make a determination regarding the existence of a
subsidy with respect to UES and BSplc/BSES and not their previous
owner, BSC. 19' Further, the Panel found that UES and BSplc/BSES
did not receive a benefit as a result of 1985-86 financial
contributions to BSC since the fair market value had been paid.1
9 2
In Delverde, the Federal Circuit, independent of the WTO Panel's
analysis, also found Commerce's methodology, which presumes a
benefit to a privatized entity, invalid. 9 3 Thus, both the WTO and the
Federal Circuit essentially agreed that Commerce cannot presume a
benefit in order to find a subsidy in the privatization context.
Presuming a benefit in this context is inconsistent with the intent of
United States law and with the United States' obligations under the
WTO Subsidies Agreement.'94
includes the residual value of any remaining subsidies at the time of the sale." Id.
Attachment 1.1, para. 135. Further. the EC suggested that the benefit inquiry
should incorporate the degree to which market value was paid. Id. para. 61.
190. See id. paras. 6.85-.86 (finding Commerce incorrectly construed the term
benefit and failed to establish existence of a subsidy, thus the United States
violated its Article 10 commitments).
191. See id. para. 6.70 (finding since benefit determination with regard to BSC
was based on BSC receiving a financial contribution irrespective of commercial
terms, consideration paid in change-of-ownership would change the equation).
192. See id. para. 6.81 (explaining that fair market value consideration for
productive assets ensures UES and BSplc/BSES did not receive assets on terms
more favorable than the market would allow, therefore, there is no benefit).
193. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1367 (explaining Commerce's per se rule - that a
privatized entity derives a benefit from a prior non-recurring subsidy - is in "direct
conflict" with the statute).
194. See id. at 1366 (explaining that Congress did not intend Commerce to
always presume that a previously countervailable subsidy continues in a change-
of-ownership situation); British Steel Panel Decision. supra note 12, paras. 6.71-
.72 (rejecting the United States' argument, that there is an irrebuttable presumption
that a benefit continues to flow to a privatized entity, as inconsistent with Article
1.1(b)).
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E. DELVERDE CONSTRUES UNITED STATES LAW AS "NOT
INCONSISTENT" WITH WTO BRITISH STEEL DECISION
Although the Delverde court did not base its analysis on the WTO
Subsidies Agreement, it delivers a devastating blow to Commerce's
current application of the benefit component of the subsidy definition
in the privatization context."15 The Delverde court specifically
referred to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(D) and (E) as clearly defining the
subsidy elements of financial contribution and benefit. 16 Further, the
court said the change-of-ownership provision does not alter the
meaning of a subsidy." 7 The change-of-ownership provision merely
cautions Commerce to refrain from making a per se rule assuming a
benefit is conferred or, in the alternative, assuming a benefit is
extinguished."89 As the court explained, if Commerce had examined
the terms of the transaction between Delverde and the previous
owner of the pasta factory, it may have reached the conclusion that
Delverde paid full market value for the assets purchased; thus,
Delverde could not have received a benefit from the previous
owner's subsidies.99
In spite of this holding, Commerce does apply a per se rule, which
is exactly what the court cautions against'O The Court held that
195. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369 (noting that the WTO Panel deemed
Commerce's methodology invalid under the WTO Subsidies Agreement, while the
Court found the same methodology invalid under the amended Tariff Act).
196. See id. at 1365-66 (stating that 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677 (E)(i)-(iv) construe a
benefit where a person receives an advantage from that which is available in the
market, including the purchase of goods or services for more than "adequate
remuneration"); see also supra notes 102-117 and accompanying text (discussing
how the URAA changed United States law to comply with the WTO Subsidies
Agreement).
197. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1366 (explaining that the change-of-ownership
provision does not change the fundamental requirement that a financial
contribution, directly or indirectly given, and a benefit must be found for a subsidy
to exist).
198. See id. (finding that Congress did not intend a "per se rule" declaring an
arm's length change-of-ownership irrelevant or dispositive in determining whether
a privatized entity has received a benefit).
199. See id. at 1368 (referring to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(5)(D)(iii) and (E)(iv) to
support the assertion that a subsidy could only be found where goods and services
were purchased for less than adequate remuneration).
200. See id. at 1367 (arguing the fact that Congress added the change-of-
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Commerce's methodology was inconsistent with the language of the
statute because Commerce's methodology presumed Delverde
received a benefit based solely on the fact that Delverde purchased
assets from an owner who had previously received subsidies?01' The
Court directed Commerce to examine the "facts or circumstances" of
the relevant transaction.2
Thus, Delverde's message is similar to the British Steel Panel
Decision: the benefit analysis begins and ends with whether or not
there was an arm's length fair market value transaction.2 3 If fair
market value was paid, the benefit of a prior non-recurring financial
contribution to a state-owned entity before privatization is
extinguished. 2° As a result, the benefit does not travel to the new
owners who paid value for all they now own."' The Delverde and
ownership provision implied that Congress did not consider such an event
irrelevant); id. (failing to make specific fact findings regarding a transaction results
in a per se rule assuming a benefit is conferred, which is inconsistent with the
intent of the statute). But see Final Rule Countervailing Duty Regulations 63 Fed.
Reg. at 65,354 (asserting that there is no need to re-determine whether a benefit is
conferred because a change-of-ownership provision is irrelevant despite a fair
market value transaction).
201. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1367 (reporting Commerce incorrectly deemed
that the fact that Delverde's purchase was for fair market value was irrelevant to
the subsidy determination).
202. See id. (finding Commerce failed to produce an evidence that assets were
bought for "less than adequate remuneration") (emphasis added); id. at 1370
(suggesting Commerce recalculate the countervailing duties to be imposed against
Delverde "without regard to the former owner's subsidies" if Commerce is unable
to support a determination of a benefit conferred).
203. See id. at 1368 (distinguishing prior precedent, including Saarstelhl, as not
in conflict with the Delverde holding because those cases were limited to the
privatization context where Commerce applied its methodology under an
"ambiguous" pre-URAA statute). The court does note a distinction between a
private-to-private sale, as was the case in Delverde, and a privatization transaction,
where a government may have "other goals" that could "'affect the terms of the
privatization transaction," potentially resulting in terms inconsistent with market
considerations. Id. at 1369. Despite the aforementioned distinction, the overall
concept that a benefit cannot be assumed and no benefit can be conferred where
fair market value is paid remains valid. Id. at 1368.
204. See id. at 1368 (explaining that Commerce must determine whether
Delverde paid full value for assets in order to determine whether a benefit had been
conferred from prior owner's subsidies).
205. See id. (asserting that the statute does not permit Commerce to assume
Delverde received a benefit and allocate a portion of subsidies to privatized entity,
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British Steel decisions seriously undermine the validity of
Commerce's methodology by finding it inconsistent with the intent
of United States law and with the United States' obligations under
the WTO Subsidies Agreement. Although Commerce currently
appears unwilling to recognize the binding precedent of these
decisions, these decisions should prompt Commerce to change its
policy.
206
Notwithstanding the binding precedent of Delverde, Commerce
has a duty to consider the United States' international obligations,
especially as discussed in British Steel, when applying the subsidy
definition.20 7 Indeed, the Charming Betsy doctrine of 1804 states, "an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of'
nations if any other possible construction remains."2"8
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States should apply its countervailing duty law in a
way that encourages, rather than penalizes, privatization efforts.2"" In
thereby implicitly rejecting GIA methodology).
206. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (noting that Commerce
Redeterminations subsequent to Delverde adopted the pre-GIA methodology
where the terms of the transaction are completely irrelevant and a benefit is
presumed to confer to the new owners).
207. See Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (explaining that absent explicit congressional intent to the contrary, statutes
should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with international obligations); see
also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, art. 3.2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
RoUND, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1227 (1994) (stating that WTO panel decisions serve to
clarify provisions of the WTO Agreements).
208. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118, 2 L.
Ed. 208 (1804) (asserting that the interpretation of the Act should be (lone in
context of the "laws of nations"); id. at 118-21 (finding the Charming Betsy not
subject to seizure despite prohibition of commerce between United States citizens
and France because the Act of Congress did not cover the owner, a foreign
national).
209. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, paras. 4.20-.23 (discussing
that Brazil, a third party participant in the British Steel decision, stated that it has
undertaken a "vast privatization programme" with the intent of eliminating
government subsidies, but it was concerned about the effect of United States policy
on these efforts); id. para. 4.104 (expressing Mexico's concerns that current United
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particular, the United States should assess whether privatized entities
derive a "benefit" from prior non-recurring subsidies by recognizing
that the prior "benefit" is extinguished if there is an arm's length
transaction at fair market value.
A. REASSESS COUNTERVAILING DUTY RULES
In light of recent developments, Commerce should undertake a
rulemaking exercise to reassess its countervailing duty rules with
respect to privatization. A policy adjustment via a rulemaking
exercise would reinforce the United States' long-term leadership role
as an advocate for competitive market-based economies and in
particular privatization of state-dominated economies.210 Commerce
States policy could negatively impact exports of privatized steel companies).
Indeed, Professor Cooper, an international economics professor at Harvard
University and former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, commented:
U.S. countervailing duty practice ensures that countervailing duties will be
assessed as financial penalties on privatized firms that enjoy no economic
benefit from government contributions provided to state-owned predecessors.
[]The United States is not countervailing any economic benefit conferred on
goods crossing our borders. The practice must be seen as purely protectionist
on behalf of U.S. domestic firms in competition with the newly privatized
firms.
quoted in British Steel Panel Decision. supra note 12, Attachment 1.2, para. 17.
210. See DtNAVO, supra note 3, at 44 (noting the statement by the Treasury
Department that the United States should "support private sector-oriented growth,
encourage privatization, and discourage, where appropriate, direct government
activity in the economy"); id. at 56 (explaining that the United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID") has been instrumental in encouraging and
assisting developing countries in their privatization efforts); Secretary of State
Confirmation Hearing Before Senate Foreign Rel. Comm., 107th Cong. 15 (2001),
available at 2001 WL 39589 (Statement of Colin Powell, Secretary of State
nominee) (arguing that privatization could be an important part of economic
recovery in Nigeria); Asian Fin. Crisis Hearing Before Asia Pac. Subconfn. of
House Int'l Rel. Comm. 105th Cong. 7 (1998), available at 1998 WL 47081
(Statement of Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury) (expressing
support for the International Monetary Fund reform plans for Indonesia and
Thailand in the wake of Asian financial crisis. which emphasized the need for
accelerated privatization programs); Fast Track ..luthoritv tlearing BeJbre
International Economic Policy and Trade Subcomm. of House International
Relations Comm., 105th Cong. 3 (1997), available at 1997 WL 592066 (Statement
of Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economics, Business and
Agriculture) (stating United States' failure to adhere to "difficult path of market
freedom" and continue to lead on trade will undoubtedly slow privatization and
deregulation efforts in other countries); F)' 98 Budget Multilateral Development
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should reconsider proposals put forward during the 1998 rulemaking
process for countervailing duty regulations."' In particular,
Commerce should consider regulations that would establish a
rebuttable presumption that subsidies are extinguished in the case of
an arm's length fair market value change-of-ownership transaction.2 2
The outcome of pending cases before the CIT may prompt these
changes.1
Since prior United States case law addressing this issue applied
pre-URAA United States countervailing duty law, Commerce's
current methodology can and will be challenged. 2  The Federal
Circuit's Delverde decision and its dicta regarding British Steel
opens the door for a challenge under current United States
countervailing duty law by a formerly state-owned privatized
company that has been assessed countervailing duties.2"5 These
developments should hearten interested parties and parties should
continue to pursue this litigation, especially if Commerce proves
unwilling to engage in a rulemaking exercise.
Banks Hearing Before International Economic Policy, Export and Trade
Promotion Subcomm. of Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 105th Cong. 6 (1997),
available at 1997 WL 165598 (statement of Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury) (arguing for continued support of development banks that provide
support for privatization efforts worldwide).
211. See Final Rule Countervailing Duty Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348
(Nov. 25, 1998) (detailing various sides of subsidy debate in privatization context);
see also Comments of British Steel PLC on proposed CVD regulations (Nov. 17,
1997), available at http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/cvd-cmts.htm (listing several sets of'
comments from various parties dated June and December 1997, where British Steel
suggests a specific regulation for privatization situations in countervailing duty
investigations).
212. See Final Rule Countervailing Duty Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. at 65,352
(repeating one group of commenters' argument that Congress' mandate to examine
change-of-ownership transactions on an individual basis indicates Congress
contemplated extinguishing prior subsidies in such circumstances).
213. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting the status of several steel
cases pending before the CIT).
214. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1368 (noting Saarstahl concerned privatization,
but applied pre-URAA law). Commerce filed final Redeterminations regarding
several steel-related cases in December 2000. These cases are in the briefing stage
before the CIT as of this writing. See Steel-Related Redeterminations, supra note
15.
215. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369 (stating that the Federal Circuit decision "is
not inconsistent" with British Steel Panel Decision).
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B. INTERVENTION BY CONGRESS
If a rulemaking exercise is not an option, Congress could intervene
by discussing the implications of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) regarding
change-of-ownership and subsequently clarifying its intent with
respect to this provision. As previously mentioned, little debate on
the implications of the change-of-ownership provision occurred
during consideration of the URAA. 216 Report language, which could
be added to upcoming trade legislation, should interpret this statute
in a way that is consistent with the holdings in Delverde and British
Steel. The language could also include a policy statement reaffirming
United States support for the transition from state-dominated to free-
market economies through privatization and other means. Moreover,
the language must emphasize the positive effects of privatization on
the global economy and economies of developing countries, as well
as potential disincentives that current United States countervailing
duty law has on privatization.2 1 The strength of domestic interests
who originally supported 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(F) - Is and the
increasingly fragile congressional support for free trade ' 9 will make
216. See Codevilla, supra note 8, at 462 (stating that the change-of-ownership
amendment was adopted as part of non-controversial staff recommendations
because there was little understanding of the economic and legal implications of
this amendment).
217. See WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: TiHE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 45-46 (Oxford Press 1995), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/htmllextpb/Bureaucrats/soe.htm (arguing that large
state-owned sectors inhibit growth, a problem that is pronounced in low-income
countries, which tend to have large state-owned sectors). Compare id. at 39
(reporting on several case studies where privatization efforts resulted in tangible
benefits, including more efficient operations and greater investment). This report
details the difficult challenges countries already face in reducing the role of the
state in their economies without the added challenge of United States
countervailing duty laws. Id. at 175.
218. See Codevilla, supra note 8, at 461 (asserting that this amendment was a
"top priority" for the steel industry lobbyists).
219. See Edward Alden et al., Zoellick Faces Task of Building Trade Bridges,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at 4 (noting difficult task ahead for USTR nominee in
building a cooperative relationship between Congress and the Executive Branch in
light of the Clinton Administration's inability to win congressional approval of
trade negotiating authority). Compare 146 CONG. REC. H 4909 (daily ed. June 21,
2000) (rejecting a joint resolution to withdraw from the World Trade Organization
by a vote of 363-56) with I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 30-32 (3d
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this policy option a complex political undertaking, but one worth
pursuing in the long term.
C. WTO LITIGATION
The WTO litigation concerning the EC's challenge to the twelve
U.S. countervailing duty orders on imports of various steel imports
from formerly state-owned steel mills has recently moved forward.
After consultations, which began in November 2000, proved
unsuccessful, the EC requested the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to
establish a panel to consider the matter.220 The panel report on this
matter will likely be released Spring 2002.221 If the United States
finds itself on the losing end of this dispute as it did in the British
Steel case, it will be required to bring its policy in line with its
commitments under the WTO Subsidies Agreement.222 The United
States should agree to adjust current administration of its law and
take a case-by-case approach when it examines privatization
transactions for purposes of determining whether a benefit has been
conferred, as opposed to assuming a benefit is conferred. The EC for
its part should accept the benefit-to-recipient standard for
determining a subsidy that it advocated in British Steel, 2 3 as opposed
1995) (noting general consensus and nonpartisan nature of a generally "open-
market" trade policy by Congress in the post World War II period up until the
1980s).
220. See Status of Dispute Settlement, supra note 2 (noting EC's request for
consultations on twelve countervailing duty orders); U.S. Affirns Compliance with
WTO Ruling on Korea Stainless Steel Antidumping Duties, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
(Sept. 11, 2001) (noting activities of September 10 meeting of WTO Dispute
Settlement Body including EC's request to establish panel to consider twelve U.S.
countervailing duty orders imposed on various steel imports from former state-
owned mills in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
221. See WTO Trading into the Future Disputes Overview, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatise/tif_e/disple.html (last visited Oct.
1, 2001) (explaining it can take up to 45 days for a panel to be named plus six
months for a panel to conclude by issuing its report).
222. See id. (noting losing party must state its intention to follow
recommendations of panel at dispute settlement body meeting held within 30 days
of issuance of panel report and losing party will be given reasonable time to
comply once its states its intention to follow the recommendations).
223. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, Attachment 1.1, para. 117
(explaining the benefit requirement mandate that before countervailing duties can
be imposed, the "company under investigation" must have been deemed to have
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to the cost-to-government approach it has previously supported.'
Such an agreement would establish a precedent for resolving future
subsidy cases.
Failure to resolve this conflict portends greater conflict in the
future, as more countries adopt countervailing duty laws modeled
after the United States become members of the WTO and attempt to
lessen the government's role in their economies.225 Indeed, if other
countries apply countervailing duty laws in the privatization context
as the United States currently does, the United States could face
liability for past subsidies given to now privatized entities. In British
Steel, the EC raised this possibility by citing the United States
Enrichment Corporation ("USEC") case involving a formerly
government-owned company that oversaw uranium processing and
received billions of dollars in subsidies.22' The EC suggested the
United States could face potential liability for subsidies given to
USEC if other WTO members were to apply countervailing duty
laws as currently applied by the United States. -'
The United States should move quickly in meeting WTO-related
challenges to its countervailing duty laws, especially in light of
increasing tensions over the subject of unfair trade laws in the WTO
received a competitive advantage).
224. See supra notes 42, 92, 111, 116 and accompanying text (asserting United
States' long time support of the benefit-to-recipient standard, versus EC cost-to-
government standard, to determine existence of a subsidy).
225. See Frances Williams, Beijing Optimistic on 1WO Talks, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
11, 2001, at 8 (noting difficult issues that remain for negotiators including
Beijing's use of agricultural and industrial subsidies): Frances Williams, Report
Reveals Change in WTO Actions. FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000 (reporting statistics
from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), which
suggest developing countries are increasingly resorting to anti-dumping and
countervailing duty investigations).
226. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12. Attachment 1.1, para. 62
(describing the privatization process for a major United States exporter, the former
United States government-owned USEC, which received -'subsidies amounting to
billions of dollars over more than 50 years").
227. See id. para. 65 (describing the valuation process for USEC, which did not
include an accounting of prior subsidies, as consistent with accepted valuation
techniques, but noting the inconsistency with current administration of United
States countervailing duty law).
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context.28 Meanwhile in future trade rounds, the United States
should not only continue to press its case for reducing disruptive
trade subsidies, but also adhere to the holding in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. United States that countervailing duties should offset a benefit, or
in other words, a competitive advantage gained in a manner
inconsistent with commercial terms.
229
CONCLUSION
The WTO found that the United States violated its obligations
under the WTO Subsidies Agreement in the December 1999 British
Steel Panel Decision.2 30 This decision, which rejected Commerce's
change-of-ownership methodology,' in conjunction with the
Delverde23 2 decision, suggests that Commerce's current practice of
assuming a benefit is conferred regardless of the terms of the change-
of-ownership transaction must change.
This particular dispute regarding subsidies can be resolved with
228. See Recent WTO Anti-dumping Decisions, supra note 133 (noting that in
several recent WTO decisions concerning trade laws, in separate cases, the EC and
United States were both found to be violating their WTO obligations); see also
Peter Norman et al., U.S. Threatens the EU with Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8.
2001, at 5 (describing at least nine major trade disputes between the United States
and the EC). But see Hugh Carnegy, Guilt Drives West to Adopt Lofty Ideals: Will
Rhetoric on Tackling World Poverty Translate into Action, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 30,
2001, at 9 (describing non-tariff barriers as an obstacle to growth for developing
countries, while commenting that United States and EC disputes regarding
subsidies could lead to a reduction in such barriers overall).
229. See Zenith, 437 U.S. at 455-56 (holding countervailing duties are meant to
offset an "unfair competitive advantage" conveyed to foreign producers as a result
of government subsidies).
230. See British Steel Panel Decision, supra note 12, para. 6.86 (finding the
United States failed to demonstrate the existence of subsidy; therefore, the United
States application of its countervailing duty law was inconsistent with the purpose
of such duties, which is "to offset any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly"
upon a particular product).
231. See id. para. 8.2 (finding no provision of United States law requires
imposing countervailing duties in privatization context, but urging the United
States to reform its administrative practice to avoid imposition of countervailing
duties where legitimate privatization occurs).
232. See Delverde, 202 F.3d at 1369 (holding Commerce's methodology
inconsistent with United States law "irrespective" of the WTO decision, but noting
the WTO decision "is not inconsistent with [the court's] holding.").
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minimal political costs in the international arena and should be
removed from the growing list of trade conflicts between the United
States and Europe.233 The United States and Europe already face a
difficult task in building consensus between developed and
developing countries. 234  This dispute could have important
implications for privatization efforts in developing countries and
should not be allowed to drive a further wedge between developed
and developing countries.235 Developing countries are struggling to
build consensus for a future trade round and are already litigating a
number of difficult disputes within the WTO dispute mechanism. '36
Failure to adjust Commerce's current application of the
countervailing duty rules threatens the United States' credibility in
its efforts to pursue a trade policy oriented toward liberalization and
open markets. 37 In Commerce's 1998 final countervailing duty
regulations, it refrained from changing its privatization methodology
by saying that unless the courts interpret the law differently the status
quo is sufficient.3 The recent decisions of the Federal Circuit and
WTO suggest that the status quo violates United States international
obligations under the WTO Subsidies Agreement as well as United
233. See A Different, New World Order, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2000, at 89
(listing major trade disputes involving the European Union and the United States).
234. See id. at 83-84 (noting rising influence of Mexico, India, South Africa, and
Egypt, among others, in pressing the United States and Europe to uphold their
Uruguay Round commitments and pursue trade agendas often at odds with the
United States and Europe).
235. See id. at 83 (discussing tensions between developed and developing
countries in formulating a trade agenda and noting developing countries are more
reluctant to follow the lead of the United States and Europe in trade matters).
236. See id. at 89 (illustrating twelve disputes that are either coming to fruition,
on appeal, or have been decided with sanctions in place).
237. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 300 (suggesting a way in which individual
countries respond to subsidies via implementation of countervailing duty laws can
"undermine liberal trade policies").
238. See Final Rule Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. at 65,355 (explaining
reluctance to codify new privatization rule based on the possibility that the -courts
may, in the course of their review of the current methodology, adopt an
interpretation of the law that would either validate or overturn" competing
suggestions for a new rule). Commerce seemed to leave it to the courts to decide
between commenters' primary suggestions, which provided for no pass through of
a benefit where there was an arm's length fair value transaction or a complete pass
through of a benefit regardless of nature of transaction. /d.
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States law. Thus, the time is ripe for a policy change from
Commerce. If the CIT remands some of the current litigation on this
matter, Commerce would do well to engage in a rulemaking exercise
to bring administration of the law into compliance with these recent
decisions.
